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Terror and Indifference: The Device Paradigm and the Nicaraguan Contra War
Director: Prof. Albert Borgmann
The substantive theory of technology argues that technology constitutes a new type o f 
cultural system that radically restructures the social world as an object of control. The device 
paradigm modifies the substantive theory o f technology by describing how technology 
transforms and deeply patterns everyday life and foreign affairs on the basis o f human 
decisions or agreements. Using a “policy device,” the Nicaraguan contra war is explained 
against a foreground of political disengagement and cultural indifference and a background 
of imperialism and a struggling socialism.
The foreground o f a device is the commodity procured by the device. In the public 
foreground (the internal component), the U.S. government claimed it was attempting to 
procure greater political freedom inside Nicaragua. The background of a device (the external 
component) is its machinery. In the background of policy, the U.S. used terror, intimidation, 
contra forces and a variety o f illegal methods to force a political shift to occur inside 
Nicaragua. The array of policy devices used by the U.S. government to injure Nicaragua and 
procure political damage were designed to be concealed, dependable, and unobtrusive to 
those designated internal. Within Nicaragua, the injuring was palpable and felt by human 
flesh. The U.S. received the comforting commodities, Nicaragua, the violent machinery o f 
the policy device.
The political theory and ontological foundations of the policy device is developed and 
applied. The history and paradigmatic character of U.S.-Central American relations, captured 
primarily as imperialism, is examined. The Sandinista administration’s failed attempts to 
guide Nicaragua toward socialism, politically marginalize the privileges o f the elite and 
redirect technology toward the common good is explained. The structure and empirical 
consequences of the contra war is shown to be an outcome o f historically designating 
Nicaragua an external element o f the policy device. Failure o f the Sandinistas at nationwide 
polls in 1990 and 1996 suggest the slow rise o f the standard device paradigm and its 
indifference to strong social justice within Nicaragua. During the contra war we had terror 
and indifference. Now we have an even less tractable situation, peace and indifference.
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Chapter 1 
Terror and Indifference
What happened in Nicaragua during the contra war is still being both resisted and 
absorbed. A growing literature o f historical accounts, political analyses, and on the 
ground reporting provide abundant facts that have passionately conveyed how policy and 
values are compressed by the crucible o f combat. These accounts cast long shadows upon 
the U.S. as they are told and retold, subverting and loosening to many degrees the deep 
meanings and lessons they suggest. With all this uncovering, telling the untellable, a 
greater problem remains - severe wounding inflicted on a society lingers, like shrapnel 
lodged too deep to remove. Embedded shrapnel is a deep, nearly immutable memory of 
injury which links Nicaragua’s suffering to U.S. policy. Wounds and scars are carried 
forever.
The growing chaos and repression which spawned the National Sandinista 
Liberation Front (FSLN) and their ultimately successful revolution in 1979 are an example 
o f chaos not averted, o f change that was not incremental, controlled or glacial in pace. 
When authoritarian order and oneness falls apart, fall back positions are prepared. 
Contradictions are invented. United States official government thinking became obsessed 
with the use o f polarities, with showing how different the U.S. and Nicaragua had become 
in such a short time span. It is as if no similarities could be perceived anymore. Nicaragua 
developed a counteridentity. This mechanistic thinking, built on the limited ideological 
parameters available or expressible on Capitol Hill, matured quickly into a firm, cold logic
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that dehumanized and drove the contra war to its futile end.
Americans figure mainly in numerous forms o f annihilation created in United States 
Central Intelligence Agency office space. Since there were no American dead seen in the 
landscape of our imagination, the sorrow o f war was not heartfelt. The deeper internal 
events that solicit sympathy, care and emotional changes were largely absent. American 
popular response was captured mainly as indifference. There was, o f course, dissent and 
reporting o f events.
Implicit in the official U.S. government approach to Nicaragua during this period 
was that the establishment o f socialism, a hostile social paradigm, would not be tolerated 
in this hemisphere. This essay will look at deeper meanings of the contra war and how the 
true purposes o f U.S. activities in the contra war still need to be understood and culturally 
absorbed. I will show how resisting these truths led inevitably to indifference.
This is a tale about a power struggle, competing plots to capture the hearts and 
minds o f the Nicaraguan people, a plot with many forces looking, no, glaring at each 
other. On the one side were the feces o f the FSLN with its Marxist-Leninist roots, literary 
crusades, nationalization of industry, land reform, and the rapid bureaucratization of 
government functions. From the U.S. came trained counterrevolutionary guerrilla armies 
(contras), attacking health clinics, assassinating civilians, mining harbors and roads, 
blowing up bridges, forcing recruitment and destabilizing what little infrastructure was left 
after the insurrection o f 1979.
Using the device paradigm as a policy device, I will attempt to disclose how and why 
the contra war gained momentum, complexity and injuring capacity amidst growing
indifference. The foreground of a device is the commodity procured by the device.1 In 
the public foreground, the U.S. government claimed that it was attempting to procure 
greater political freedom inside Nicaragua by defeating and disabling the Sandinista 
administration. The background of a device is its machinery. In the background of policy, 
the U.S. used terror, intimidation and a variety o f other methods to cause a political shift 
to occur inside Nicaragua.
The array of devices used by the U.S. government to injure Nicaragua and procure 
political damage were designed to be concealed, dependable, and unobtrusive to life in the 
U.S. There was a bifurcation on the receiving end o f these devices. Inside the U.S. we 
received policy, press releases, news, and information that could be quickly and easily 
digested as information or ignored. Within Nicaragua, the injuring was palpable and felt 
by human flesh. The U.S. got the comforting commodities, Nicaragua, the violent 
machinery of the policy device.
What is o f central concern here is not so much documenting and reliving the 
atrocities o f the contra war, but o f breaking through the policy device which allowed it to 
happen. A historical approach is enticing and leads one down the road toward 
explanation, but the explanation takes on largely flat dimensions - this then that happened 
and so forth. What I hope to do is to turn the mirror o f the policy device back onto 
ourselves, onto U.S. culture, in an attempt to explain cultural indifference. Indifference is 
a desensitization, a lack of feeling for and engagement with others. This is not meant to 
diminish or refute partisan political analyses, either from the left or right. What is crucial 
is that as efforts to build, train, and deploy, the contras grew, the bulk o f citizens in this
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country did nothing and remained indifferent.
Copious articles, books, interviews and television coverage provided ample 
opportunity to absorb this information, see the immense problems we were creating, and 
take some form o f action to become involved in a humane solution. However, on the 
whole, the U.S. population did nearly nothing to halt the unnecessary injuries to the 
Nicaraguan population.
Although we are morally decent people and intellectually capable o f understanding 
the role o f the U.S. in Central America, there was inadequate follow through by U.S. 
citizens to change U.S. administrative policy. What happens is that we, the U.S. citizens, 
became implicated in political decisions as well as in the pace and patterns o f everyday life. 
Decisions that rain down bullets in Nicaragua, in the name o f the U.S. population, are 
easily made because o f the great latitude granted to government, especially in foreign 
affairs.
First, the term "implication" is important and must be elucidated. Implication, as I 
will use it here, is how we have situated ourselves with respect to technology.2 We are all 
involved deeply and implicitly in a technological society. The inconspicuous pattern by 
which we live and orient ourselves has been described as a ruling paradigm, the device 
paradigm, a social paradigm so deeply entrenched it not only informs how we conduct 
ourselves from day to day, but it patterns the organizations, institutions and government 
functions we rely upon and criticize.3 The device paradigm is also an ontological 
paradigm, patterning our relation to the non-human world.4
How has the device paradigm put its stamp on U.S. - Nicaraguan relations? How
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can we traverse the scale and dimensions o f everyday life in an extremely affluent, 
advanced industrial country toward the poverty, disease and war o f a poor Central 
American country using the device paradigm as our guide?
The device paradigm insists that life is clearly patterned along the divide o f work and 
leisure.5 Work is largely the constant servicing and expansion of the technological 
machinery, which creates the infinite stream of commodities, consumed in our leisure time. 
Work entails a deep embodiment in the patterns of life. The human creature at work is 
immersed in his interaction with the world, far too immersed to extract himself from it (he 
may die if he stops working), and thus almost without cessation he enacts a set of 
movements across the passing days and years.
Leisure time, or playtime, in contrast requires that the person be only half submerged 
in the world o f activity, able to enter and exit freely. The playful activity, even if never 
engaged in before, can be started in seconds, or ended just as quickly. Consumption 
makes no demands of skill or discipline. The person in leisure or at play, protected by the 
separability o f himself from his own activity, does not put himself at risk. At play he acts 
on the world outside his body with less intensity than the person at work does. If he 
sometimes puts that world at risk (the leisure world), it is because his own immunity from 
risk makes him inattentive to the forms o f alteration he is bringing about. It is the very 
nature o f work - as is dramatically visible in forms of physical labor and craft such as coal 
mining, farming, building or inventing - that the worker "works" to bring about severe 
alterations in the world (relocating a bridge, building a piano, road or a house where there 
was none), and only brings about those alterations by consenting to be himself altered
(that his muscles, posture and gate will be altered is certain, that he may undergo more 
severe alteration or injury is at least risked).6 Work, o f course, is a wide spectrum of 
experience. The trend in a high-tech society such as ours, is that contact in the world of 
work can be attenuated to the pushing of buttons and the monitoring o f dials and 
computers. The slow disappearance of drudgery and toil through work is not replaced in 
the world o f leisure.
U.S. citizens living in this pattern o f work and play raise children, get involved in 
numerous activities and busy themselves with ever more refined leisure activities. Not 
being especially bad or ignorant, we have consented to create a culture patterned after the 
device paradigm- The problem is that the great success o f technology in attacking hunger, 
disease, illiteracy, transportation, communication and education (in fulfilling the promise 
of technology) has given way to an attempt to discover remaining burdens and seek and 
welcome devices that will further disburden us from even these benign burdens.7 There 
are terrible debilitating effects created by life under the device paradigm. The most 
debilitating is the withdrawal from political life. The withdrawal o f politics as real, as 
meaningful, and worthy o f attention and intervention is an abiding problem.8 Perhaps 
political failure is the most fundamental type o f human failure. By political failure, I mean 
the failure to recognize and influence the social origins and consequences of political 
decisions which affect society.
Our attention span, under the rule o f the device paradigm, has thus been constricted 
to the narrow sphere of work and the inconsequential sphere o f consumption. Work and 
leisure (especially leisure), in a technological society, are filled with imagination and
information that could cause something like world citizenship to occur.9 However, the 
contra war showed again what a callous disregard we have for people less fortunate than 
ourselves and affected directly by U.S. war making.
The activity o f war is, viewed within the framework o f this opposition 
(work/leisure), the most unceasingly radical and rigorous form o f work.10 The soldier's 
survival is at stake not in the diffuse way it is for the worker who out o f his labor creates 
his own sustenance and will, if he stops, eventually starve; it is more immediately and 
acutely at stake; it is another soldier's direct object to kill him, and his own work is a 
target for the other. The form o f world alteration to which he devotes himself does not 
simply entail the possibility o f injury but is itself injuring, and it is this form of self­
alteration to which his own body is at every moment subject.11 He cannot will his entry 
and exit from the activity o f war on a daily basis. There is not, as there is for most 
workers, a brief interval o f exemption at the end of the day when he is permitted to enact a 
wholly different set of gestures, when the divide between work and leisure is crossed. The 
timing of his eventual exit from war will not be determined by his own will but by the end 
of the war, whether that comes in days, months or years, and there is o f course a very high 
probability that even when the war ends he will never exit from it. The boy or man in war 
is, to an extent, found in almost no other form o f work, inextricably bound up with the 
men and materials o f his labor. He learns to perceive himself as he will be perceived by 
others, as indistinguishable from the men o f his unit, regiment, division and above all 
national group. He is also inextricably bound up with the qualities and conditions - forest, 
field, rainforest, desert - o f the ground over which he walks or runs or crawls and with
which he craves and attempts identification.12 In the camouflage clothing and the 
camouflage postures is his work, now running bent over parallel with the ground, now 
arching forward conforming the curve of the back to a companion boulder, now standing 
upright and still and narrow as the slender tree behind which he hides. He is the trees and 
the wind, he is a small piece of Nicaraguan terrain broken off and floating dangerously 
through the rain forest. He is a fragment o f American earth wedged into a hillside near 
Estili. He is dark blue like the sea. He is light gray like the air through which he flies. He 
is sodden in the green shadows of earth.
The extreme difference in the degree o f a person's separability from his own activity 
in work, leisure and in war is one manifestation of the distance that separates them. There 
is an estrangement between the military and mainstream society. We know that billions 
are spent on supporting the military. In the case of a covert war fought with proxy armies 
there is a major discrepancy in the scale o f consequences. Given this discrepancy how do 
you make a war intelligible to a comfortable citizenry? You make war into a game or 
contest.
The comparison o f a war and gaming is nearly obscene. This analogy either 
trivializes war or conversely attributes to gaming a weight and consequence it cannot bear. 
To flatly assert an equality, war is a game, games are war, imports attributes from one into 
the other’s sphere. This transfer may occur in either direction. The hatred that in war 
grants nothing to an opponent (as the U.S. did to a Sandinista-led Nicaragua) is 
sometimes imported into descriptions o f peacetime games and contents that now become 
in their competitive urge and obsession disguised forms of the passion to destroy others.
Nevertheless, an identification must be made because war is in its overall structure o f 
action a contest.13
The difficulty for U.S. citizens entrenched within the device paradigm is that 
movements and activities of the contestants o f a covert contra war are largely unseen.
The men described above as inextricably engulfed in the materials and labor o f their task 
are moving across the land toward others who, equally engulfed, move toward them and 
like them, work to out-perform the other in their appointed labor. In the case of the 
contra war, the Sandinistas sought to make and preserve their new world while the contra 
army saw it as an opportunity to unmake the Sandinistas world. American troops were 
not directly involved in the contra war. The language of contest is critical because it 
registers the central fact o f reciprocity. In order for the U.S. to show that the contest was 
at all even it had to remind us that we were fighting a U.S.S.R. backed communist regime, 
a formidable, well-funded, and worthy opponent. As I will later show in this essay, 
numerous national entities became involved in the massive planning, organizing, and 
financing; however, the overall contest can be crystallized and reduced to two discreet 
entities: contras (U.S.) versus Sandinistas (Nicaragua). The central activity o f war is 
injuring.14 War in its formal structure is a contest. Another twist on this story is that the 
U.S. recruited largely Nicaraguans to fight their own people. Thus the U.S. fostered a 
civil war pitting brother against brother.
How can the device paradigm help us to understand the nature o f war? Specifically, 
how can a nation drift effortlessly through history while at the same time destroying and 
creating history in another nation? In what way does living within the device paradigm
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lead to desensitization? Perhaps the crucial institution that must be understood is that of 
government. Government is the iynch-pin, the go-between, of citizens and their external 
affairs. Political action in a technological society usually revolves around domestic affairs 
and securing for all the benefits and virtues o f a technological society. Citizens support 
the government machinery through the payment o f taxes. The machinery of government 
has its paradigmatic inaccessibility, yet in some respects remains an open system.15 There 
are votes, debates, access to records, lobbying. Policy experts weigh in on any substantive 
debates, especially any concerning national security. However, citizen action is at a 
deplorably low level; fewer than one half o f all eligible voters typically cast a ballot.
Neither the foreground of our culture, the consumption of and movement through 
commodities, nor the background, the political and economic conditions which secure a 
peace in which raw materials are transformed into the hard invisible technological 
machinery that ultimately delivers commodities, were touched at all by the contra war, nor 
the Persian Gulf War for that matter. This bespeaks a tremendous stability o f the 
technological order.16 The pace and texture o f life in the U.S. during the contra war did 
not change. Throughout the 1980's the economy expanded. There were, o f course, 
economic changes within the U.S., but the clear fact is that the contra war did not disrupt 
American life. Some were moved to act in opposition to the war, but most were 
unaffected and were probably uninterested and indifferent to what was happening to this 
obscure country in Central America.
The policy device that sponsors war is an example of how the device paradigm can 
pattern foreign affairs. The device paradigm is devoted to technological affluence. That
which supports the accumulation or concentration of wealth is supported, according to the 
theory of the device paradigm.17 In Nicaragua, however, the process of accumulation of 
wealth and widespread impoverishment were both promoted by the Somoza dictatorship 
which combined systematic electoral fraud with open repression. Evidence of the device 
paradigm within mainstream Nicaragua was thus largely absent during the Somoza era 
(1934-1979). Evidence o f strong social justice within Nicaragua was also absent during 
this same period. The Sandinistas viewed the concentration of wealth as fundamentally in 
conflict with a just society. Inadequate attention to social justice will be examined as an 
unresolved and disturbing component o f the device paradigm. By exploiting these major 
structural flaws in Nicaraguan society, the Sandinistas were able to form a large tactical 
alliance which overthrew the Somoza government. After the revolution the Sandinistas 
openly guided the nation toward socialism. I will show in chapter 2 that the unresolved 
part o f the device paradigm is resolved in socialism in favor o f social justice but to the 
detriment o f the technological machinery and affluence, the Sandinista government of 
Nicaragua (1979-1990) being the case in point. Chapter 3 is an examination of the history 
of U.S. - Nicaragua relations under the guiding idea that imperialism, as an extreme form 
of the device paradigm, divides people into an internal and an external component. Where 
internal, people become workers and consumers (U.S.); where external, they become, 
partly due to fear of communism and of the possible priority o f social justice, an 
exploitable resource (Nicaragua). The ontological foundations o f technology using 
Heidegger will also be explained. Chapter 4 will show how making people into an 
external resource leads to terror and violence. The terrorist policies o f the U.S.
government toward Nicaragua during the Contra War will be examined, as well as their 
consequences. Chapter 5 draws the conclusions; the defeat of the Sandinistas at the polls 
in 1990 and 1996 shows the rise o f the standard device paradigm and its indifference to 
strong social justice within Nicaragua. Current social conditions inside Nicaragua will be 
assessed. Now there is peace and indifference rather than terror and indifference - a much 
preferable state, but one that is not morally encouraging. Because the device paradigm 
leads to political disengagement, the exploited will remain at the margins o f awareness, 
power, and affluence.
C hapter 2
The FSLN, Socialism and the Device Paradigm
Social conditions in Nicaragua were deplorable for the vast majority o f citizens prior 
to the revolution. However, certain groups did benefit from the Somoza dictatorship, 
namely the Guardia and the economic elite. Somoza did not reinvest in the infrastructure, 
did not educate the children, and did not ensure that health care was provided. Poverty 
was, and unfortunately remains, the norm. The detailed mechanics o f how and why 
Nicaragua became integrated into and dependent on the U.S. economy is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 3. Suffice it to say, that poverty is a human artifact produced by 
the exploitation o f the many by the few. The latter who have traditionally ruled the 
country for their own selfish ends were joined and supported in this exploitative behavior 
by powerful foreign interests. The FSLN was able to theoretically address these problems 
to gain political support during their period o f armed struggle and insurrection, 1961- 
1979.
Roughly, what developed over time in Nicaragua was a system that many scholars 
came to label as “dependency” or “neodependency.”1 Most who write on this subject 
agree that dependency is a complex political, economic and social phenomenon that serves 
to block human development o f the majority in certain privilege-dominated Third World 
countries where the economies are heavily externally oriented. In such countries, one 
finds that even during periods o f rapid economic growth the benefit o f such growth fails to
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“trickle down” in any but the most trivial way to the majority o f people. Social stagnation 
of dependent countries is due, according to dependency theory, to the combination of 
income-concentrating, externally oriented, and externally conditioned form of capitalism 
with political systems controlled by those privileged minorities who benefit from such 
poorly distributed growth.
It is very important to note that in order for the dependency syndrome, with all o f its 
negative human and ecological consequences, to exist, it is necessary for a country to have 
both an externally oriented economy and a socially irresponsible political elite.2 External 
economic orientation, though essential, is not enough in and of itself to cause the socially 
regressive dependency syndrome. Japan and South Korea have economies which are both 
heavily externally oriented. However, the political leadership in those two more tightly 
knit societies appears to have a greater sense o f social responsibility than the elites o f 
Latin America, and, hence, externally stimulated growth has led to a general rise in the 
standard of living. In these two countries, politicians supported private enterprise, 
infrastructure, human development and public health. The device paradigm is alive and 
well in those two countries, and many similar countries. The primary evidence of the 
device paradigm is in advanced capitalist countries. Evidence of the device paradigm in 
the Third World will grow only if middle class consumption increases in these areas.
Evidence of the device paradigm is manyfold and occurs on many levels. The device 
paradigm is the dominant way the promise o f technology is fulfilled. The promise of 
technology is the way certain cultures have given form to the 18th century enlightenment 
ideals o f liberty, equality and self-realization.3 In other words, the promise o f technology
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is o f a piece with these root concepts o f democracy. Technology promises to control 
nature, liberate people from misery and toil, and to enrich our lives. Democracy needs 
technology, to thrive. Where the device paradigm thrives, there is usually thought to be a 
free and prosperous nation. To be more precise, there are several crucial features which 
evidence the device paradigm: ubiquity o f commodities,4 divided labor,5 political 
disengagement,6 a secure nearly invisible infrastructure,7 large scale consumption,8 and 
indifference to those at the margins o f affluence.9 Where these features are absent, so is 
the device paradigm. Measurement o f the device paradigm is consumer spending, 
indirectly measured by personal income and the gross domestic product.10 Marx 
embraced the fruits o f the device paradigm but saw problems with their distributioa
Toppling the dictatorial apparatus that the Somoza family created and expanded 
over the years was the main goal of the FSLN. This was extremely difficult due to the 
National Guard, or Guardia, which was created and run by the Somozas to keep a tight 
reign over its operations and politics. Anastazio Somoza Garcia (Somoza I) commanded 
the Guardia in 1934. The Guardia, over time, became a private army, the military wing of 
the Liberal Party, which enforced the rules o f the Somoza dictatorship.11 Dissolving the 
Guardia was, o f course, one plank in the Sandinista’s political platform.
Anastazio Somoza Garcia had two sons, Tachito and Luis. Tachito's brother Luis, 
(Somoza II) died o f a heart attack in April 1967. This event signaled the concentration o f 
political power and the entire family fortune in Tachito's (Somoza I ll’s) hands. Estimates 
o f the Somoza's wealth at the time vary enormously; different sources at the time placed it 
anywhere between $50 million and $300 million.12 In 1968 the Somoza family occupied
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an area equal in size to the neighboring republic o f El Salvador; they owned about half of 
all registered landholdings in Nicaragua, and a quarter o f the nation's best arable soil.13 In 
the countryside they were administered by two firms, Compania Agropecuaria and 
Sucesores del General Somoza; in urban areas they were mainly registered in the name of 
Salvadora Debayle de Somoza, Tachito's mother.14 In his largest fincas Somoza produced 
the countries main export commodities: cotton, coffee, beef and also sugar, an important 
newcomer which was introduced in the Nicaraguan economy when the Somozas' anti- 
Castroism was rewarded by Washington with a sizable chunk of the old Cuban sugar 
quota.15 Other smaller units offered a staggering variety o f produce: cocoa, tobacco, 
bananas, pineapples, maize, beans, rice, sorghum, sesame and all kinds o f vegetables. A 
score o f industrial and service companies completed the picture. The Somozas owned 
Mamenic (the Nicaraguan shipping line), Lanica (the country’s airline), the cement plant, 
textile factories, sugar mills and the local concession o f Mercedes Benz. By 1978, after 
two heart attacks and a nerve-racking absence out o f the country for three months,
Tachito Somoza Debayle returned to Nicaragua to preside over an emergency meeting 
where Tachito supposedly signed over his holding in the Somoza business empire to the 
rest o f the family.16 For the first time, it was reported that a notarized statement listed the 
full extent o f the family fortune. The most frequently mentioned figure was $600,000,000 
for Tachito alone, and more than $1,000,000,000 if one took into account the joint 
holdings o f all branches o f the family, the Sevillas, Debayles, Sacasas, Pallais and their 
multiple permutations.17 An anonymous inventory o f Somoza owned enterprises 
circulating at the time in Managua listed 346 companies covering eveiy imaginable field o f
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activity: coffee, sugar, cotton, agriculture and commerce in general, textiles, shipping, 
customs agencies, travel agencies, fishing, meat packing, cattle ranching, warehouses, a 
harbor, air transport, construction, aluminum products, oil refining, match manufacturing, 
tobacco, publicity, recreation centers, banking, real estate, cement, consulting firms, auto 
sales, furniture, electrical appliances, dairy products, footwear, distilleries, publishing 
houses, radio, television, geothermal energy, pipelines, fertilizers, rice, shipbuilding, 
mining, recording, computing, laundromats, even exports o f human blood and plasma.18 I 
list all these companies not to bore the reader, but to illustrate the greed and vast holdings 
o f the Somoza family. Not only did Somoza exert extreme economic power through his 
land holdings and enterprises and payoffs, he directly appointed municipal officials and 
would quickly dispatch the Guardia anywhere in the country to quell political uprisings. 
Repression and poverty throughout the country actually grew and became intolerable. 
Over the decades various political organizations came into being and cracks began to form 
in the Somoza edifice.
Culturally, the difference between 1934-1979 (the Somoza era) in Nicaragua and the 
same period in the U.S., is that few o f the critical features o f the device paradigm were 
present in Nicaragua, while in the U.S. the device paradigm grew in strength and became a 
more fully entrenched lifestyle, even among the aspiring poor. The middle class continued 
to expand in the U.S. while in Nicaragua no such social change occurred. The device 
paradigm is devoted to the pursuit o f technological affluence. Affluence is prosperity that 
is characteristic o f technology and consists in the possession and consumption of the most 
numerous, refined and varied commodities.19 The goal o f the affluent is to live now.
There is undeniable appeal in this rich imperial life that is the fulfillment o f the promises of 
technology: liberation, enrichment and conquest.20 Affluence is defined by personal 
income. Therefore personal income determines one’s standard of living in a technological 
society. The way equality is roughly measured in a technological society is by comparing 
the income levels o f various social groups within the society.21 Social justice can be 
understood as an equal level o f affluence.22 There were, perhaps, groups of people in 
Nicaragua during the late Somoza era which lived the affluent life, in the above sense. 
However, they were few and far between. In Nicaragua, there was very limited political 
liberty and practically no technological affluence. The social unrest in the 1950’s and 
1960’s inside the U.S. taught us that there is a significant flaw in the pursuit of 
technological affluence, and that is the absence o f strong social justice. However, the 
lack of social justice in the U.S. was moderated by a rising standard o f living, social action 
and the courts; the situation was not as extreme as in Nicaragua where armed struggle was 
the only possible solution.
What the FSLN did, and by 1978 almost the entire country, was identify a ruling 
elite which controlled a huge portion o f economic and political power and which used its 
own private army, the Guardia, to enforce this repressive social order. The socialists did 
not have a problem identifying a definite exploiting capitalist class. The FSLN, in alliance 
with progressive business sectors defeated Somoza and the Guardia in 1979.
The Somoza administration could be described as authoritarian and took the form o f 
a military dictatorship. There was no clearly articulated ideology. Somoza’s speeches are 
likely to be as good a guide as any. Somoza, to the end, defended himself negatively, as a
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responsible alternative to communism. Authoritarianism is, in this sense, primarily 
defensive. Authoritarianism is against change, against the inefficiency and corruption o f a 
parliamentary democracy. Authoritarianism gives the highest place among political values 
to security: Hobbes’ first “law o f nature” was to seek peace.23 Authoritarianism endorses 
unlimited government, free from constitutional constraint and attaching no great 
importance to the rule of law.24
Castro, communism and strong social justice were seen as threats that seriously 
menaced security. These threats were generated both internally and from outside. The 
Somoza dictatorship was an example o f technology that was admitted in pieces and parts, 
but controlled by an oligarchy. As for military technology, it is clear that the Guardia was 
an example of the use o f technology against people in an attempt to crush liberty. To get 
ahead under the Somoza regime you either had to (1) work for Somoza directly or 
indirectly or (2) join the Guardia or agree to be a political appointee. The Sandinistas had 
grand plans to erase political support for authoritarian rule and create a socialist society.
The Sandinistas draw heavily from Marx and Lenin in their ideology. They have also 
attempted to turn Sandino into a Marxist even though Sandino focused on the removal o f 
the U.S. marines, not the bourgeoisie elite. Instead of Sandino’s ideas, the Sandinistas 
adopted their hero’s symbols, his image, and his myth.
Neither the FSLN nor the revolutionary government formally labeled itself Marxist. 
However, in numerous speeches and interviews, Sandinista leaders have acknowledged 
their debt to Marxism.
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"We, the founders and builders o f the FSLN, prepared our strategy, our tactics and 
our program, on the basis of Marx's teachings,"25 
“I believe we are Marxists.”26
“[We] are guided by the scientific doctrine o f revolution, by Marxism-Leninism.”27
The Sandinistas have treated Marxism as a body of insights that they could adapt to their 
own needs and Nicaraguan conditions. Marxism is the basic source of Sandinista thought. 
However, Sandinista leadership was suspicious o f abstract theory. Fonseca warned the 
party leader o f the dangers o f "sterile dogmatism" and "pseudo-Marxist gobbledygook" 
and even suggested that Nicaraguan radicals were lucky to know so little about political 
theory.28 Their political innocence, he believed, saved them from political paralysis and 
internecine conflict.
Marx's intellectual legacy is subject to various interpretations. Any Marxist attempt 
to understand the world must come to grips with the historical schema Marx and his 
collaborator, Engels, first laid out in the 1848 Communist Manifesto. The Manifesto 
scenario forms the background against which the broad outline o f Sandinista theory 
developed.
In the Manifesto and much o f his subsequent work, Marx was concerned with the 
transitional periods that separate three great historical epochs: feudalism, capitalism, and 
socialism. Marx analyzed the sweeping economic transformation that undermined feudal 
society and the political revolutions that substituted the rule o f the bourgeoisie - the 
modernizing class o f merchants and industrialists who promoted economic change - for
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that of the land-owning aristocracy.29 The capitalist order that arose out of feudalism 
freed the peasant masses from hereditary obligations o f serfdom and created 
unprecedented material abundance.
But capitalism, Marx concluded, was a flawed system. As it matured, capitalist 
society was itself moving inexorably toward self-destruction. The wrenching boom-and- 
bust cycle of the capitalist economy demonstrated the inability of the system to manage its 
own explosive productivity. The proletariat - the class o f urban wage earners created by 
capitalist growth - threatened the political stability o f the bourgeois order. Exploited by 
their employers and victimized by periodic depressions, the workers were developing a 
consciousness o f their own interests and a capacity for political organization which would 
allow them to challenge the rule o f the bourgeoisie and assume the lead in the creation of a 
new, just, and rational society: socialism.
The parallel that Marx draws between the two transitions depends on an implicit 
theory o f progressive classes. At a critical moment in history, the progressive class, by 
pursuing its own objectives, moves the entire society forward. The bourgeoisie played 
this role in the first transformation. The proletariat would do so in the second.
Marx was convinced that human consciousness advanced in tandem with the 
material aspects o f society.30 Historically, as people extended their control o f nature and 
learned to cooperate for purposes o f production, they freed themselves from superstition 
and developed a more progressive social consciousness. His view suggests a long-term 
optimism about the capacity o f people to remake themselves. But it also carries a 
qualifying, short-run pessimism. If consciousness is linked to material progress, it cannot
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leap ahead of material development. Marx would not, for example, expect socialist ideas 
to prosper among feudal peasants or, for that matter, the peasants o f contemporary 
Nicaragua: their backward material lives limited their political outlook.31
Marx was a brilliant sociologist. Much o f what is known about the social bases of 
class consciousness depends on his insights. But he was obviously less successful as a 
prophet. The urban-based proletarian revolutions that he expected in advanced capitalist 
societies never came. Instead, the revolutionary upheavals of the twentieth century 
occurred in backward rural societies, like Russia, Mexico, and China. As social theorists 
and revolutionaries surveyed the failure, they raised questions about Marx’s work that 
would later be relevant to the development o f Sandinismo.
One set o f questions concerned the role o f leadership. Do historical processes lead 
inevitably to revolution or do they require the efforts o f radical intellectuals and 
professional revolutionaries like Marx and Lenin to unleash their potential? Another 
concerned the locus o f revolution. If  revolutions were not taking place in advanced 
capitalist societies, why not? Could a socialist revolution take place in a materially 
undeveloped society? A third set o f questions revolved around the post-revolutionary 
situation. If socialist revolutionaries came to power in a backward society, could they 
immediately initiate socialist policies or would they have to promote capitalist 
development to achieve the level o f material abundance that Marx required as a 
precondition o f socialism? In either case, what should be the character o f the post­
revolutionary state? Decades o f Marxist debate have swirled about these questions.
No participant in the debate has been more influential than V.I. Lenin, whose ideas have
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dominated Latin American thinking about Marx since the 1920's. Lenin’s contribution 
centers on the vanguard party, imperialism and the revolutionary state.
Lenin’s conception of a vanguard party did more than any other Marxist idea to 
shape the FSLN. Lenin contended that a vanguard organization of professional 
revolutionaries was a prerequisite to socialist revolution. Without the leadership o f a 
vanguard party, the workers, however militant, could never advance beyond what Lenin 
called “trade union consciousness,” the viewpoint that focuses on narrow economic issues 
- hours and wages in a given firm or industry - while ignoring the character of the larger 
society, its economic system. Lenin proposed that membership in the vanguard party be 
selective. Only the most able, dedicated, and politically sophisticated would be allowed to 
join. Members o f the vanguard would have to be clandestine, disciplined, and centralized, 
while at the same time, they immersed themselves in the lives o f workers and the activities 
of their unions and political organizations. The vanguard party exists to channel the 
“spontaneous” protests of the masses. “Unless the masses are organized, the proletariat 
is nothing;” Lenin wrote in 1905. “Organized - it is everything.”32
Lenin, like Marx, characterized all states as inherently class based and coercive.
“The state”, he declared, “is nothing but a machine for the oppression of one class by 
another.”33 Only primitive societies, or future socialist societies, in which class distinctions 
have been eliminated can escape the logic o f their definition. Having no classes, they have 
no state.
Lenin explicitly rejected the notion that Western democratic states, based on 
universal suffrage, stand above classes. He regarded parliamentary democracy as the form
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of class rule peculiar to capitalism, a convenient facade of abstract political equality to 
conceal the objective reality o f economic oppression.34 Thus, he saw no prospect that 
socialism could evolve peacefully out o f democracy.
If the state is inevitably coercive and class-bound, Lenin reasoned, the revolution 
must first smash the capitalist state and replace it with a proletarian state capable of 
constructing a socialist order over the resistance of the bourgeoisie - in Marx’s words, “a 
dictatorship of the proletariat.” The working class, wrote Lenin, must develop “undivided 
power directly backed by the armed force of the people. The overthrow of the 
bourgeoisie can be achieved only by the proletariat becoming the ruling class capable of 
crushing the inevitable and desperate resistance o f the bourgeoisie, and of organizing the 
working and exploited people for the new economic system.”35
Lenin conceived o f the revolutionary movement as an alliance of urban workers and 
poor peasants organized by a vanguard party - “the teacher, the guide, the leader” o f the 
people in their effort to “reorganize their social life without the bourgeoisie and against the 
bourgeoisie.”36 As this account implies, Lenin conceived the dictatorship o f the proletariat 
as a transitory historical phenomenon bridging capitalism and socialism. In the process o f 
eliminating private ownership of the means o f production - the economic basis o f class 
differentiation - the revolutionary state abolishes social classes. By definition, there is no 
longer a role for the state. Lenin was convinced that the administration o f common 
affairs, in the absence o f class antagonism, would be a simple matter.
The Sandinistas deeply and radically internalized the idea of class conflict. Their 
ideology started from the Marxist premise that class conflict is inevitable and a source of
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progress in human history. In a pamphlet directed at students in 1968, the FSLN declared, 
“Historical experience.... teaches that there can be no peace between millionaires and 
workers ... that there can be no situations other than the following: either the rich exploit 
the poor or the poor free themselves, eliminating the privileges of the millionaires.”37 
The text, written by Fonseca, goes on to attack the “demagogic” notion propagated by 
Christian Democrats that there can be “conciliation o f classes.” A popular glossary of 
political terms issued in 1980 by Sandinista agricultural workers union and the 
Agricultural Ministry observes, “In the capitalist mode o f production there are two 
fundamental classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, which have opposed interests.”38 
This indicates that Sandinista leadership did not, or could not, see a continuum between 
the desires o f the affluent and the desires and aspirations o f the poor and oppressed 
whereas here in the U.S. there is a much different understanding of the way wealth and 
income are distributed. In the U.S. people openly strive for affluence. Most remain 
comfortably in the middle class while the lower and lowest economic classes strive to be 
middle class and the middle class desires to be upper middle, and so on. This dynamic 
prevents the formation of class consciousness and drives the development and maturing of 
the device paradigm. The Sandinistas never saw things this way and ultimately paid a 
huge political price because of it.
The Sandinista Front has consistently described its own ideology, historical role, 
objectives, strategy, friends, and enemies in class terms. The party’s leaders frequently 
observed that Sandinista thought is “classist.”39 The FSLN is the “leader o f the class 
struggle” and seeks to change the “balance between classes in favor o f the oppressed.”40
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Formulations o f the movement’s friends and enemies have varied with political conditions, 
but the workers and peasants are virtually always counted as revolutionary allies (with 
somewhat stronger emphasis on the former) and leading sections of the bourgeoisie, in 
league with imperialism, are seen as opponents.
Sandinista leadership has always shown frith in Marxism. But Sandinista thinkers 
from Carlos Fonseca to the leadership o f the 1980's have understood that classical 
Marxism did not fit Nicaraguan conditions very well. The economic and political system 
that the Sandinistas saw in their country was not the capitalism (or for that matter the 
feudalism) o f the Communist Manifesto. Rather it was a distorted form of capitalist 
development that reflected the influence o f “imperialism.” Sandinista spokesmen loosely 
used the term imperialism to refer to the economic and political power of the advanced 
capitalist countries, especially the United States. In an imperialist world the capitalist 
powers “exercise a hegemonic power over other countries (their colonies), which they 
subjugate by strong links o f political and economic dependency, and impede their 
economic growth.”41 Development was distorted by an emphasis on the production of 
exports such as coffee and cotton, needed by the wealthy capitalist countries. “Our 
frustration”, Sandinista agricultural minister Jaime Wheelock once observed, “was to grow 
sugar, cocoa, and coffee for the United States; we served dessert at the imperialist dinner 
table.”42 Wheelock and other Sandinista analysts concluded that the Nicaraguan economy, 
because o f its distorted character, was incapable o f self-sustaining growth and unable to 
meet the basic material needs of its own people.43
The working poor of Nicaragua knew they were oppressed but because of the
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distortions o f the Nicaraguan economy failed to develop a clear sense of class identity. 
Most o f the salaried labor force in export agriculture worked seasonally and depended on 
subsistence agriculture or marginal urban employment between harvests. Nonetheless, the 
Sandinistas overcame the inadequacies o f the proletariat by stretching the definition o f the 
class base e f the revolution and by emphasizing the vanguard role o f the party. The FSLN 
came to conceive of itself as a leader o f the “worker-peasant alliance.”44 There was much 
maneuvering, within the FSLN during the long years prior to the revolution, over the 
appropriate class basis for the revolutionary movement.
The faction within the FSLN which ultimately was triumphant, called the Terceristas, 
called for broadening the revolutionary movement. In their 1977 Platform, the Terceristas 
leaders proposed a “triple bloc made up o f the proletariat, the peasantry, and the petite 
bourgeoisie” as the “moving force o f the revolution.”45 The proletariat (defined to include 
both urban and rural wage earners) is the “fundamental force” of the revolution.46 The 
petite bourgeoisie is defined to include “artisans, professionals, shopkeepers, people 
involved in service activities, and revolutionary students and intellectuals.”47 The anti- 
Somoza bourgeoisie were not regarded as part of the inner revolutionary “triple bloc” but 
as a partner in a Sandinista-dominated coalition. The coalition with the broad class o f 
middle sectors o f the economy was described as a “temporary and tactical alliance.”48 The 
ultimate role o f the middle sectors and even o f the bourgeoisie remained nebulous in 
Sandinista thinking. The Sandinista party hoped to mobilize and serve the workers and 
peasants.
Nothing is so central to the Sandinistas conception of themselves and their place in
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history as their definition of the FSLN as a revolutionary vanguard.49 Vanguard is the 
most common, yet troubling, word in the Sandinista lexicon.50 The Sandinistas owe this 
powerful idea to Lenin, who conceived o f an elite party o f ideologically motivated, 
disciplined professional revolutionaries capable o f guiding a politically immature people 
through a process of radical social transformation.51 The vanguard party has a conscious, 
heroic link with history. They are history in the making. The Sandinista vanguard is not 
only a leader in the class struggle but also one o f a passionate ‘Tew men and women who 
at a given moment in history seem to contain within themselves the dignity o f all 
people.”52
The vanguard sets the example, they are the "standards” for all to see and compare 
themselves to. Through struggle, the people as a whole reclaim the strength and dignity 
shown by a few. The exploited need a vanguard to lead them to their "definitive 
liberation." In a Sandinista broadside, party strategy is mapped out:
The revolutionary party, by taking a firm class position, a scientific ideology, 
correct strategy and tactics, united in political principles, places itself at the 
forefront o f all society and gathers in its bosom the political and military leadership 
o f the revolutionary forces which struggle and work to bring the revolution 
towards bigger achievements.53
To be on the edge, the forefront, the party must draw into itself "advanced" elements o f 
the working class. In a sense, the party acts as a stand-in, or surrogate, for the proletariat 
masses. This is implicit in FSLN party declarations like, "the workers control power
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through the FSLN" or "the working class is in power in Nicaragua."54
The FSLN, especially its revolutionary leadership, is the organization o f working 
people that has returned power to the workers after seizing it from Somocismo. This 
thinking appears to equate the party with those it serves. It implies class representation 
not in a Western parliamentary sense but in the historic sense of Tellez's comment about a 
"few men and women."
The vanguard guards and leads. It guards its accomplishments and steers society 
through complex, never-ending revolutionary stages, all the while working on behalf of the 
formerly oppressed masses. Its goal is to carry through with a social revolution and a 
transformation o f the political consciousness o f the country. It is the bridge between the 
national liberation stage o f the revolutionary process and the social revolution which 
follows.
The vanguard is fraught with difficulty and tension, especially after it has deposed 
the unpopular regime and assumed political power. The vanguard literates and empowers 
yet at the same time controls and transforms. It is in a position to coerce those it purports 
to represent. What does the vanguard do if the masses resist its vision for the future or 
when the vanguard party asks for sacrifice in exchange for uncertain future benefits?
The vanguard may lose the sympathy of the workers but it retains the sympathy o f 
history. Life consists o f constant struggle and sacrifice that evoke worry and despair. A 
further problem of the vanguard is that it instructs its membership to learn from the masses 
as well as to educate and politically lead them, Thomas Borge, a co-founder o f the FSLN 
and a ruling Sandinista commandante from 1979 to 1990, said in 1981 that "We must
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banish any manifestation of paternalism, o f elitism...we must comprehend that it is 
necessary to guide the masses...Learn from the masses in order to guide the masses, that 
should be the guide for our organization."55
Can Borge be correct? Is it possible for the vanguard to escape paternalism?.
Simply, no. I agree with Dennis Gilbert that the vanguard assumes power over the 
populace, much like a parent over a child.56 Like a parent, it can only be successful if it 
prepares its charges for an independent existence and then relinquishes or shares power 
with them in the process. This is no easy matter judging by the behavior o f ruling 
vanguard parties in this century.
As Stephen Kinzer points out with innumerable examples in Blood o f Brothers, the 
Nicaraguan "masses" thought many Sandinista policies both oppressive and absurd and 
personally took great pains to either dodge the new rules or leave Nicaraguan soil 
completely.57 Kinzer notes that many rural people are fiercely independent and are very 
resistant to Sandinista initiatives in agrarian reform and trade.58 From Kinzer's perspective 
the FSLN failed because it heeded only one element o f Borge’s directive, LEAD.59 It did 
not learn to listen and abide by the diverse needs o f its constituents. Kinzer's perspective 
has depth and resonance but is marred by its anecdotal character. Gilbert, a serious 
scholar, would not dispute many of Kinzer's assertions but takes the analysis several levels 
deeper than Kinzer. Gilbert finds and masters the historical documents which ground 
Sandinista policy and identity. He shows how the Sandinistas are organized and how they 
react to crisis. Gilbert then provides detailed accounts o f how the Sandinista leadership 
recognized its mistakes and changed policy over the years on the issues of agrarian reform,
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the business community, the church and the Yankees. Gilbert finds evidence that the 
Sandinistas were more than the simple control freaks as portrayed in many accounts and 
made substantial and sincere attempts to meet the needs o f the rural and urban population, 
albeit sometimes unsuccessfully.
I can not dispute Kinzer's and Gilbert's findings that perhaps a majority chafed under 
FSLN leadership. There is widespread evidence, on an international scale, o f discontent 
and revulsion with a Marxist approach to governance. Historically and politically 
Marxism has M ed. The crucial elements o f its M ure perhaps lie in its conceptions of 
democracy and participation.
The FSLN's conception of democracy emphasizes results over process and popular 
"participation” over electoral institutions. Underlying and complexifying this is die party's 
vanguard status and its historic role o f guiding the masses to the promised land. From the 
view of the vanguard, a party that represents the majority is, by definition, democratic.
One that does not is undemocratic, even if it honestly maintains formal democratic 
procedures. Soon after gaining power in 1980, a Sandinista communique attacked 
"democratism" as a "liberal bourgeois ideology" that stresses abstract freedoms without 
regard to real content in a class society. Peasants, under Somoza, were deprived of their 
land and so were free to sell their labor. Capital, the communique goes on to say, was free 
to exploit the people any way it wished. Culture and information was freely manipulated 
to preserve the status quo. Somoza was free to crush any movement that defended the 
people. The Sandinistas accused their conservative opponents o f reducing democracy to 
elections. Somoza, they remind listeners, regularly held elections in Nicaragua and
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regularly won. To these "corrupted" models of democracy the Sandinistas oppose the 
concept o f popular participation.
Democracy means "PARTICIPATION of the people" in the entire range o f the 
nation's affairs. The broader the participation, the greater the democracy. Further, 
democracy neither begins nor ends with elections. "True democracy" starts in the 
economic order, as social inequalities decline and the living standards of workers and 
peasants rise. The point b  that the previously silenced voice would be given a role in the 
shaping o f national policy.
The concept o f participation remained ill defined for the Sandinistas. The FSLN 
created many channels for citizen participation in the revolution, including Sandinista mass 
organizations and unions, political rallies and "face-the-people" meetings, at which citizens 
are invited to question leaders about governmental policies. The FSLN does not clearly 
distinguish participation from political mobilization. If  the two are equated then 
participation b  reduced to an activity whereby the party communicates its ideas to the 
people and the people either support or decline to support the FSLN. The assumption b  
that all worthy participation b  for the revolutionary cause and not an alternative political 
party.
Kinzer, in Blood of Brothers, detaib the political oppression inside Nicaragua during 
the Sandinistas tenure.60 Freedom of the press was sporadic, and numerous political 
groups were marginalized through various means.61 It was not until 1990 that mayors and 
regional council membership were actually voted into office, rather than appointed by the 
FSLN. It b , however, important to note that the Sandinistas did direct considerable funds
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toward social programs for the poor and did not routinely slaughter their own people like 
the death squad governments o f "fledgling democracies" in El Salvador and Guatemala.
The FSLN has long conceived o f its task in terms of a two-stage revolution, typically 
denoted as national and social liberation. The role o f the vanguard party is key. The two- 
stage revolution is most explicitly described in the 1977 Platform and subsequently 
reaffirmed in many speeches and party documents.62 The Platform emphasizes the role o f 
the vanguard in linking the two phases:
Breaking the chains o f imperialist rule determines our national liberation process. 
Breaking the yoke o f oppression and exploitation o f the reactionary Nicaraguan 
classes determines our social revolution process. The two historic undertakings 
will be inseparably linked with the existence o f a solid vanguard and a Marxist- 
Leninist cause to guide the process... Our country’s backwardness and its 
dependent capitalist system determine the objective need to complete the 
revolutionary democratic state in order to assure the structural and superstructural 
(material and ideological) bases for the revolutionary process toward socialism.63
The key objective o f the new government would be “the neutralization o f potential internal 
and external enemies while we accumulate the military and mass forces that guarantee the 
continuity o f our (revolutionary) process.”64 Concretely, this meant the creation o f a new, 
revolutionary army committed to the FSLN and the political mobilization of the 
population through a large network of Sandinista mass organizations.65 While this was 
happening, the new government would carry out a social reform program to benefit the 
masses and win popular support. And it would begin to reorient the national economy, 
increasing state control, reducing foreign dependency, and encouraging growth.66
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The mass organization, the new education system, and even the army were to 
contribute to the development o f a new political consciousness in the people, a critical 
prerequisite for the transformation o f society.67 One purpose o f the new education system 
was to “strip the system of exploitation naked before the eyes o f the exploited and give 
them an instrument that will convert them into the actual subjects (agents) o f their own 
history.”68 Both within the military and without, officers and soldiers should be 
“transmitters o f (political) consciousness.”69
The political and economic range of the first phase program suggests that the FSLN 
expected to control the new regime. But Sandinista theory did not anticipate a Marxist- 
Leninist dictatorship o f the proletariat, rather the new government would be a broad based 
“popular democratic” regime. The continuing economic and political participation o f the 
progressive bourgeoisie was especially important if two critical goals o f the first phase 
program were to be attained - successfully resisting imperialism and building the material 
bases for a new society. The Sandinistas planned to maintain “hegemony” in the new 
government. The bourgeoisie were to be producers without political power. There was a 
definite tension between the party’s plans for a broad based regime and its notions o f its 
own role and class commitments.
“Socialism” is the goal o f the second phase of the revolution, according to the 
repeated assertions o f party documents and spokesmen. “Our great objective”, wrote 
Fonseca in 1969, “is socialism.”70 Two key internal documents, the 1917,Platform and 
the 1979 re-unification accord among Sandinista factions also take “socialism” as the final 
aim o f the revolution.71 In numerous speeches delivered from 1983 to 1986 before
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sympathetic audiences, National Directorate members reaffirmed this article o f Sandinista 
faith.72
There appeared to be socialist consensus among leaders o f the FSLN. However, the 
Sandinistas never clearly explained what they meant when they talked o f socialism.
Perhaps the following passage from a party document published in 1980 was meant as a 
definition:
The objectives o f the Revolution are none other than to fight until it guarantees the 
well being of all the workers. Instead o f the shack, decent and humane housing. 
Replace the floor with a bed to which the producer o f social wealth has a right... 
this is the Sandinismo whose potential is contained in the economic and social 
project o f the people, that today has its concentrated expression in the popular 
uses o f the profits that the APP (People’s Property Area, the state sector) is 
beginning to produce.73
Here the state sector (most significantly the large agro-export enterprises seized from 
Somoza and his associates) is seen as containing the germ o f a new socialist society which 
will provide the worker a decent material standard o f life.
Many Sandinistas were drawn into a vision o f the future that promised more than 
material justice. Their brand o f socialism is built around the concept o f the “new man” 
who has overcome the self-serving values promoted by capitalism. In a 1979 speech, 
party member Carlos Tunnermann, then Minister o f Education, observed:
The new Nicaragua also needs a new man who has stripped himself o f selfishness 
and egotism, who places social interests before individual interests.... The 
individual (new man) is most fulfilled when he works within the collectivity.74
This vision seems to appeal most to Sandinistas whose beliefs are rooted in a radicalized
36
Christianity. The most explicit Sandinista endorsement o f this concept is a 1983 
government document establishing national education policy. The document describes 
formation of the new man as the objective o f Nicaraguan schools. The new man, product 
o f a “new education” will be patriotic, committed to the interests o f the masses, anti­
imperialist, internationalist, the enemy o f exploitation, racism and oppression. He will be 
disciplined, creative, cooperative, hard working, fraternal, modest, self-sacrificing, and 
persuaded that “individual interests should coincide with social interests.”75 He would be 
ready to defend the nation and the revolution. See Spot Run and The Cat in the Hat are 
long gone, so to speak.
Not all Sandinistas bought into the concept of the new man. Humberto Ortega,
Head of the Armed Forces, offered a vision o f the future in a 1981 speech to army
officers. He stressed ham and television sets.
(We want to) escape underdevelopment and create wealth so that the people will 
be happy and not just further socialize our poverty. We want to see the day when 
all our people can eat ham and they can have television sets and take vacations. 
That’s what we want. We’re not going to promote a mentality that says we should 
live like nuns or under socialism with a Christian character.76
This is perhaps a crude articulation o f a socialist vision. Adequate nutrition and wages, a
paid vacation and television in every home. There is little indication that Sandinistas
agreed about what socialism meant or how and when it might be achieved in Nicaragua.
Ideas about what socialism will be or should be in Nicaragua were still diffuse and not
very clear. This again shows that socialism is admittedly stronger in its critique of
capitalism than in its design of a coherent alternative.
In summary,
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the central argument o f Sandinismo is this: The historical scenario o f Marx’s 
Communist Manifesto is essentially correct, but the historical development o f 
Nicaraguan society has been decided by imperialism. Imperialist domination o f 
Nicaragua has meant a dependent economy, an underdeveloped state, an 
incipient proletariat and a bourgeoisie incapable o f playing its historic role. 
Sandinista theory puts the historical train back on track by broadening the 
definition of the class basis o f revolution and emphasizing the vanguard role o f 
the revolutionary party.77
The distorted and immature nature ofNicaraguan society required a two-stage revolution.
This would be a gradual transition from the programs of national liberation toward a
socialist society through a complicated process o f historical change. The vanguard party
will patriotically guide the people it leads through history in the making.
Once the FSLN established itself as the primary and really only significant party in 
power, it followed through on many o f these theoretical principles. This created immense 
concern, conflict, and crisis within Nicaragua. The business owners, for good reasons, 
saw the FSLN as a threat to the future o f private enterprise and private property. What the 
bourgeoisie regarded as a right, the Sandinistas saw as a privilege, subject to social 
control
In late 1983, government and private economists informally estimated private 
participation in the economy at 55 to 60 percent o f the GNP.78 But both business 
representatives and Sandinistas officials recognized that such figures overestimated the 
position of private enterprise in the mired economy.79 Government regulation had curbed 
managerial freedom to set prices, lower or raise wages, fire workers, buy raw materials, 
redeploy capital, obtain credit, or buy foreign exchange.80 By that time, the government 
owned and controlled all banking and foreign exchanges within Nicaragua. Private
investment was shrinking. Most new investment was being made by the government. 
Government strongly supported many industries but still threatened to eliminate ownership 
and management o f these same enterprises.81 Illegal or arbitrary confiscation o f private 
property and the elimination o f court appeals caused severe distress throughout the private 
sector.82 Clearly, the FSLN wanted business to accede to the interests and economic 
policies o f the state. Similar problems occurred in the religious affairs o f Nicaragua. The 
FSLN and the official Catholic Church regarded each other with deep suspicion from the 
beginning of the revolution. When the FSLN moved to consolidate its power, the church 
hierarchy sided with the bourgeoisie, as it had done for many decades. The church- 
revolution conflict escalated throughout the Sandinistas tenure.
Nonetheless, the Sandinistas did decisively win the 1984 elections. The FSLN did 
not think much of elections. “Neither bullets nor ballots will defeat this revolutionary 
power, this Sandinista power, this popular power!” said Daniel Ortega in 1983. Arturo 
Cruz was the leading opposition candidate in 1984. However, business and contra 
supporters ultimately did not officially field a candidate for the 1984 elections under U.S. 
pressure.83 Pre-election maneuvering completed the political transformation of the middle 
bourgeoisie. Wartime ally o f the Sandinistas and partner in the national unity government, 
the middle bourgeoisie had become the core o f the domestic political opposition and 
finally the political wing o f the contra movement.84
Even in the face o f all these difficulties and flaws, it is necessary to show in more 
detail how the FSLN changed Nicaragua and opened up society strongly in favor o f social 
justice. The revolutionary upsurge o f the 1980s threw into action a wide variety o f social
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groups that in previous decades had lacked an identity o f their own, or whose identity had 
been expressed in terms o f subordination to other actors: women, indigenous people, 
residents o f marginal settlements, religious groups. The 1980s saw the decisive advance 
o f women’s organizations and movements, o f poor neighborhoods, o f human rights 
defense groups, etc. A civil society that until then had been marked by fragmentation and 
apparent passivity went through an explosive awakening.
The relationships between these new expressions o f social discontent and the 
revolutionary organizations ran the gamut from subordination, through various degrees o f 
autonomy and coordination, to outright antagonism. In Nicaragua, during the stage of 
struggle against the dictatorship but even more so during the decade o f Sandinista 
government, the new social and labor organizations o f the central and Pacific regions 
tended to accept strategic and operational subordination to the Sandinista Front and the 
state, while the ethnic groups of the Atlantic coast struck up a quick and violent 
antagonism with the revolutionary regime.85
Unions grew in strength and numbers. However, union demands and labor issues 
often had to take a back seat to politics and military struggle. The priority o f the political 
over the strictly labor related was especially stark in Nicaragua; the Sandinistas’ multi­
class “national unity” strategy, and later economic crisis, reinforced the tendency to turn 
the labor movement into an arm o f the revolutionary state, more active in the 
implementing of overall policy than in promoting the immediate interests o f its affiliates.86 
Labor contracts became more common, but as the contra war intensified specific labor 
demands were set aside in favor o f an emphasis on discipline, service in militias and
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support for the military draft. The abdication o f a specific labor agenda reduced the 
Sandinista unions’ prestige among the working class.87 In 1988 the Sandinista 
government introduced a monetary adjustment strategy that further undermined workers’ 
standard o f living: a drastic reduction in real wages, a rise in unemployment rates and 
further deterioration o f basic food supplies.88
Sixty percent o f Nicaragua’s arable land changed hands under Sandinista agrarian 
reform, to the benefit o f two-thirds o f the country’s peasant families; the lands in the 
hands o f the large landowners shrank by SO percent.89 At the same time, the fell in land 
values, a result at first o f land reform and later o f the economic crisis, made it easy to 
become a small to medium former at a  relatively low cost. The Sandinista agrarian reform 
distributed land to some 138,000 Nicaraguan families, about two thirds o f the to ta l90 
Associative modes o f production emerged and spread along with inproved access to land. 
Almost 30 percent o f agrarian reform lands in Nicaragua were under different kinds o f 
cooperative production; in El Salvador, agrarian reform cooperatives received almost 40 
percent o f the redistributed land.91
A permissive institutional climate in Nicaragua encouraged organization among 
small and medium formers. By the end o f the decade the National Union o f Farmers and 
Ranchers (UNAG) was the country’s most active social organization, in a society that 
until well into the 1970s had been noted for its very low level o f peasant organization. 
UNAG survived the change in government in 1990 and even has taken up the demands o f 
peasants who had previously joined or collaborated with the contras.92
There are no figures on income distribution in Nicaragua, but some indirect
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indications suggest that, at least between 1980 and 1984, the combination of agrarian 
reform, expansion o f social services and growth of subsidies to basic consumption favored 
a relative improvement in the income position o f the popular sectors, a trend that was 
reversed with the policy shift and the broad deterioration of the economic picture after 
1985.93 Throughout the zigzagging, the middle class urban groups that were most 
integrated into public-sector agencies appear to have been in the best position to improve 
their access to resources and income.
During the first half o f the decade, the Sandinista regime’s policies improved the 
standard o f living o f the masses and penalized the most recalcitrant sectors o f the ruling 
class; in the second half, government policy did little to maintain these advances and, in 
the opinion o f many observers, actively worked toward their reversal.94 Social 
deterioration has accelerated in recent years, and as o f 1992, almost 69 percent o f the 
Nicaraguan population lived below the poverty line.95
The closing o f the cycle o f armed struggle and repression creates possibilities, as the 
political systems are rearranged, for social and labor organizations to progressively 
develop their bargaining power and political autonomy. These newly empowered 
organizations can then negotiate with traditional actors in the political system -  parties, 
unions, bureaucracies -  over policy and national projects so that they can be in charge of 
their own futures. Consequently, as we tally up the achievements o f these decades o f 
revolution, counterrevolution, repression and crisis, we must consider factors like 
consciousness, effectiveness and identity, and not just specific material achievements.
Even with all these changes and attempts to improve living conditions, and probably
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because of them, two things happened, (1) The FSLN showed that it alone could not 
successfully regulate both the economy and social justice, although their strong suit was 
improving social justice, and subsequently (2) the FSLN was voted out of power in 1990 
and 1996.
For the FSLN, what began as a successful project to identify and overthrow an 
exploiting capitalist class, ended with these same “classes” coming to power again in the 
1990’s. Perhaps the Marxist political currency o f class warfare, which was believable in 
1978, became dramatically less so by 1990 and 1996. The problem, for the FSLN, was 
that at the beginning (i.e. post revolution 1979), the capitalists were at fault for everything 
and nothing much else was wrong. Accordingly, the FSLN took an instrumental view of 
technology; nothing is really wrong with technology except that it has been abused by the 
capitalists. The M ed FSLN solution was to politically marginalize the privileges o f the 
elite and attempt to redirect technology toward the common good. This was supposed to 
be an achievable task as the state took control over education, health, foreign exchange, 
labor unions, wage rates, certain industries and so forth, and the state, implicitly was 
beneficent and wise. As shown above, there were many positive effects in this regard, but 
the major and compelling negative was that there were no visible elements o f the device 
paradigm present by 1990. The economy was a disaster and inflation was out o f control. 
There were ideological changes, but the overall strategy o f central control o f the economy 
was a M ure. Implicit is the assumption that people in Nicaragua want the device 
paradigm. Effects o f the contra war, the U.S. economic embargo and other factors will be 
examined in later chapters.
The social strategies o f the state to see elements o f the economy as machine-like 
which could thus be owned and controlled through central planning was a M ure because 
it misunderstands how the device paradigm works. In order for people to support you or 
your political party you must give them a stake in the machinery and fruits o f the device 
paradigm. This machinery is the largely invisible support system of technological 
infrastructure that supplies the infinite stream o f commodious devices. In this sense the 
device paradigm requires a populace involved in the expansion o f technology in labor and 
leisure. There has to be a reliable delivery system to supply labor and consumer goods to 
the people. The socialist state was overly sure o f itself as the entity that could identify and 
guide people’s aspirations and more importantly, their labor. In order for the device 
paradigm to take hold each citizen must be engaged individually in its expansion and 
entrenchment. Each person must have a stake in technology. This is, perhaps, too much 
to ask in a postrevolutionary setting which had more diffuse goals in mind. The FSLN, 
showing their true Marxist roots, tried to control technology as if it were a giant machine, 
with the FSLN as the brains and guidance system. The technological infrastructure, which 
the FSLN so desperately needed to control, fell into disrepair, and evidenced again, the 
failure o f central planning, five year plans, and so forth.
The FSLN allowed and supported the conditions for political growth and social 
change. However, the splintering o f political consciousness was not anticipated and was 
in direct contradiction to the FSLN’s project to unify political consciousness. Groups 
chafed under FSLN control. It was hard to know in advance that this would happen after 
the revolution. It is plausible, a priori, that central control o f the economy could have
worked. However, by the time the Sandinistas attempted this undertaking many other 
socialist countries had tried and M ed this approach. There simply is no bureaucracy in 
the world smart enough to pull it off, so it was arrogant to think the FSLN would succeed. 
In order for the machinery side o f the device paradigm to grow and thrive a significant 
number o f people have to have a stake in its success by way o f private ownership. By 
politically marginalizing the petite bourgeoisie the FSLN alienated the one group that 
could have assisted them in planning and investment strategies. In order to transform the 
country politically and economically on a national scale some form o f social capital is 
necessary to see people through the difficult times. Social capital are shared social 
convictions which are needed to carry people through from the external (worker) side o f 
the device paradigm to the consumption side (internal). It proved very difficult just to 
maintain employment levels, let alone dramatically raise the standard o f living. The 
Sandinistas tried to create social capital with their mass organizations, unions and fiery 
political leadership, but could not succeed in forging a strong abiding base o f support 
which could generate the necessary social capital. The FSLN was well intentioned in 
many areas o f social change, but national pride, sacrifice and anti-imperialism were not 
enough. The success or M ure o f various socialist policies was perhaps radically 
contingent on the specific conditions o f its applications. That socialism did not and 
probably will not take hold in Nicaragua shows that material achievements are very
i
important and that the path to improvements to Nicaraguan society will largely be 
determined by free market initiatives. Perhaps “imperialism” will not return to Nicaragua 
in the same form as under Somoza (I-III), but surely the pursuit of affluence will
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eventually come to Nicaragua. Nicaragua remains in the impoverished world of things and 
has yet to transition into the world o f devices.
Before the structure of the Contra War is sketched out it is necessary to look back in 
some detail at U.S. - Nicaraguan history. This glance into our historical rear view mirrors 
can help explain the Nicaraguan attempts at socialism and the predictable U.S. response to 
such attempts. The focus of Chapter three is an analysis o f imperialism and foreign affairs 
through the lens of the device paradigm. Chapter four explains the structure and 
consequences o f the Contra War and how it is a necessary outcome o f this ontology.
Chapter 3 
Imperialism and the Device Paradigm
Imperialism is the bridge that spans the history of U.S. - Central American relations. 
It is necessary to discuss imperialism in order to understand the roots of revolution and 
the future. In Chapter 2 imperialism was referred to as the economic and political power 
o f the advanced capitalist countries, especially the United States. In this chapter the 
historical dimensions and paradigmatic character o f imperialism will be examined.
The device paradigm typically characterizes how domestic affairs are tightly 
patterned and organized. My premise in this chapter is that foreign affairs and foreign 
economies can also be patterned according to the device paradigm issuing in a “policy 
device,” and simultaneously organized according to the wishes of the ruling powers and 
against the common good. The policy device is the way that imperialism is maintained. 
Creation and implementation o f a policy device, on this scale, requires long term planning 
and constant maintenance. Numerous governments, economic policies and military 
strategies are necessary for imperialism to operate efficiently. When local conditions 
change, new people are voted into office or wars break out, there are often sudden or 
perhaps subtle changes in the arrangements o f neighboring countries. Imperialistic policies 
therefore need constant monitoring and adjustments to keep them running smoothly, just 
like the power supply or the water supply. In this sense they are similar to a device.
People who set the terms o f the policy device do not bear the burden of the violent
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machinery of the device; the former are internal elements o f the policy device and the 
latter its external elements. The huge problem, obviously, is that we are talking about 
forcing and convincing people on the machinery side o f the device that these arrangements 
are reasonable and it is in their best interests to comply. Typically there is resistance and 
some type of intimidation, indoctrination or direct force is necessary to maintain the 
machinery of production in an imperialist setting. Workers have few rights and the 
politicians, for a variety o f reasons, &il to improve conditions. Imperialism is based on 
large-scale coercion; so in the example o f imperialism, the policy device is Mr from a 
neutral policy where both sides benefit equally.
There are deep historical roots to imperialistic policies in Central America. One 
would think that the effects o f such policies would, by now, be part o f the normal 
conversation in America, but such is not the case. As the device paradigm has emerged in 
America so has geopolitical ignorance. What is fascinating about U.S. imperialism is that 
it can be cloaked in numerous rhetorics, politics and fears. Because o f the ignorance and 
indifference o f the public, blatant imperialist policies can be dressed up and trotted out in 
the name o f regional security, anti-communism or improved trade relations and investment 
opportunities, with little domestic resistance. These policies are often very complex and 
involve intergovernmental agreements, subsidies, loans and a military presence. The 
machinery o f imperialism, like that o f a device, has its paradigmatic inaccessibility. It is 
arranged and implemented silently by staff in Washington. It occurs on a large scale and 
over such huge time periods that it appears normal, and is thus rendered nearly invisible on 
the internal side of the divide.
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Internal to the U.S. there are numerous effects o f imperialism which primarily benefit 
U.S. corporations and U.S. society. A steady flow o f cheap raw materials and 
manufactured goods from Central America flow into the U.S. that are quickly internalized 
into our economy. Our sea lanes and distribution networks are kept intact, free o f outside 
influence, and U.S. political hegemony in the region is maintained. What I want to show 
in the remainder o f this chapter is how and why this policy device, here called imperialism, 
has worked so effectively over time. It is my argument that the overall system that 
operates between the U.S. and Central America has characteristics o f a device. The policy 
device does so by dividing people into an internal or external component. Where internal, 
people become workers and consumers (United States); where external, they become an 
exploitable resource (Nicaragua). Those assigned to the internal component o f the policy 
device are expected to relentlessly pursue affluence. In this respect, imperialism strongly 
favors affluence. The policy device modulates the flow o f capital and goods between the 
external and internal components through implementing various types of policies that I 
mentioned. This appears to be a mechanistic, divisive and dehumanizing way of 
categorizing and placing people in the overall scheme o f things. The historical data will 
show this to be the case.
People o f Central America assigned to the external side of this divide are cursed with 
lifetimes o f poverty and struggle. Internal to a given Central American country there is 
more assigning and dividing taking place. Typically the ruling oligarchy or military assign 
themselves to be internal while the peasants and wage earners are designated external. 
Being ontological in character, the device paradigm will pattern our relations with the non­
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human world also. If  the environment is designated external, as it usually is, then it can 
be exploited and polluted at will. When the device paradigm takes hold in a country and 
more and more people are designated as internal, technology has true liberating potential. 
People are provided with decent educational options; roads and other infrastructure are 
built, repaired and maintained, basic health services are provided, infant mortality drops 
and the government begins to reinvest in its own people, rather than in the military. To 
Americans, who have been on the internal side of the paradigm for so long, these ideas are 
just common sense and not even debatable. However, the history o f the region shows that 
governments can fall which pursue such policies and it is only with extreme strength, 
determination and often civil war that a people can begin the transition from the external 
to the internal side of the policy device. Sometimes elections alone can turn the tide, but 
usually some type o f protracted social struggle is necessary.
The history o f the region shows that the U.S. will align itself with whatever powers 
are necessary to maintain the divide. This position is softening a bit as the number of 
countries involved in North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations 
expands. However, NAFTA negotiations are usually with large vibrant economies like 
Brazil or Chile. It remains to be seen if Nicaragua will involve itself in or benefit from 
NAFTA. Nicaragua is a small, almost meaningless, economy compared to other more 
prosperous countries. NAFTA is a formal invitation to the internal side o f the device 
paradigm.
Control o f Central American geography and adjacent sea-lanes is vital for North 
American "security.” Nearly two-thirds o f all United States trade and oil imports as well
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as many strategic materials depend on the Caribbean sea lanes bordered by the five Central 
American countries.1 Washington DC is closer to Nicaragua than to Los Angeles.
Central America is tightly integrated into the United States political-economic system. 
What is this "system," and how was it set up?
Central America is coming to the close o f a thirty-year period o f armed struggles. 
Many revolutionary movements have come and gone in this period. The United States 
countered these and prior revolutions with military force. Washington's recent policy in 
Central America, including the contra war on Nicaragua, is historically consistent for two 
reasons: North Americans have been staunchly antirevolutionary since Jefferson; and 
United States power has been the dominant external, and internal, force against which 
Central Americans have rebelled.2 The reason for the continual struggle between "the 
Shark and the Sardines,” as former Guatemalan President Juan Jose Arevelo called it, lies 
embedded in the history o f United States-Central American relations.3 These two themes, 
the United States’ fear o f revolution and the way the United States system of imperialism 
ironically helped cause revolutions in Central America, form the core of Walter LaFeber's 
book Inevitable Revolutions.
Early in U.S. history we became conscious o f our powers, and o f our "right" 
relationship with Central America. We understood ourselves to be the status quo power 
in the region. Let me be clear that by "we" I mean Washington bureaucrats that made and 
carried out policy with respect to Central America. These officials did not oppose radical 
change in Central America because o f public pressure. Throughout the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries the overwhelming majority o f Americans could not have located any o f
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the five Central American countries on a map, let alone ticked off the region's sins that 
called for United States economic or military control. As I pointed out earlier, this 
geopolitical ignorance is inexcusable and readily exploited by Washington.
In 1776, Jefferson provided the Western justification for revolution: a people can 
"alter or abolish" any government that no longer derives its "Just powers from the consent 
o f the governed."4 Within a decade after he wrote the Declaration, Jefferson himself 
recognized that principles o f self-determination no longer necessarily served United States 
interests. They even contradicted these interests because revolution in Latin America 
would prevent the steady accumulation of a  United States controlled isthmus. On the 
mountaintop at Monticello, in 1813, Jefferson was confident that "in whatever 
governments they (Central American nations) end, they will be American governments, no 
longer involved in the never-ceasing broils o f Europe. ...America has a hemisphere to 
itself."5 America would marginalize European influence wherever it cropped up, and seek 
to control the politics o f the region. Thus was struck the eternal contradiction in United 
States foreign policy between the principle o f self-determination, which grounds our 
constitution and whose value has been self-evident to the American mind, and the 
continued and necessary expansion of American power, whose value was also important 
and evident to certain North Americans.6 In order to carry through with this 
schizophrenic mythos America needed a master plan to achieve political stability in the 
region.
Washington feared revolutions because, they reasoned, exhausted and unwary 
revolutionary governments might be susceptible to political subversion, "the outside
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agitator." Revolution is unpredictable, irrational, not bound to the rules o f the game. 
Revolutionary governments would resemble bose cannons on a sea-tossed ship and thus 
could threaten "interests" that America has considered essential to its safety, namely, the 
right to infuse the region with capitalism and technology, which it controlled, and to 
extract the goods we wanted.7 In other words, the policy goal was to convert Central 
America into a stable external element, part o f the background of the device paradigm, to 
provide the invisible resources necessary to supply the commodities North Americans 
enjoy. Historically Central America was assigned the position o f external component.
A revolutionary government would seek changes unacceptable to U.S. long-term goals.
According to this schema, the populations o f Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, El 
Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama are considered to be in the U.S. sphere of 
influence, hence INSIDE. But it is exactly these others, who supposedly need protection 
from the OUTSIDE influence, that have revolted against United States policy and 
presence. What happened? Revolutionary peoples have seemingly denied the hegemony, 
the jurisdiction of the United States.
With a booming confidence in capitalism and the appropriations of the colonies of 
Louisiana from Spain (1803) and Texas from Mexico (1848), a dread of revolution and a 
ferocious appetite for militaiy "solutions", the "System" was erected and mainstreamed. 
The ultimate goal o f power relations between North and South was "stability" which 
makes possible a technobgical appropriation o f resources and which provides a broad 
base o f political support throughout the Isthmus. The United States has been, and still is, 
riveted to plans which secure and enhance our control over Central American nations.
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Internal political battles directly threatened United States interests in the area. Since the 
United States had long ago decided that this was "our hemisphere," the outcomes of such 
battles were crucial
In the 1870's and 1880’s, the British and French had to be kept out. In 1870 France 
began building an interoceanic canal through Nicaragua. Yellow fever destroyed the 
enterprise, but not before President Hayes warned France of the dire consequences if it did 
not stop.8 United States troops landed at least seven times, during the nineteenth century 
in Panama, to ensure that the Canal Zone remained open and free from "rebellion."9 
Britain was forced to return the Miskito coast to Nicaragua in 1895, thus conceding our 
vital strategic interest in any isthmian canal. In each o f these examples, the United States 
sought political and military control over a disputed area. After 1900, the enemy was 
Germany. Only after WWII were these enemies replaced by the Soviet menace. Fencing 
out, or containing communism, preserved the region for North American strategic 
interests and profits. There must be eternal vigilance in perpetuating this divide. Military 
mobilization is required.
Direct day-to-day control was not necessary or desirable. The United States desired 
informed control over Central American nations, which they finally obtained through a 
policy device that can be described as "neodependency." Dependency theory is a way of 
looking at Latin American development as part o f an international system in which the 
leading powers have used their economic strength to make Latin American development 
dependent on, and subordinate to, the interests o f those leading powers.10 
Neodependency has stunted Latin America's economic growth by forcing their economies
54
to rely upon one or two export crops, such as bananas or coffee, or on minerals which are 
shipped off to industrial nations for further transformation or direct consumption. These 
few export crops make a healthy domestic economy impossible, according to the theory, 
because their price depends on an international marketplace which the industrial powers, 
not Central America alone, can control.11 Such export crops also take up land (and 
concentrate it in the hands of the few) that should be used for growing food for local diets. 
Thus malnutrition, poverty, even starvation, grows with the profits o f the relatively few 
producers o f the export crops.12
Dependency disfigures local politics as well. Key export crops are controlled by 
foreign investors or local elites who depend on foreigners for capital markets and 
protection. Foreign influences thus distort economic and political development without 
taking direct political control o f the country. Dependency theory denies outright file 
fallacy of North American elites: that imperialism cloaked as investment and trade in 
Central America will result in a more prosperous and stable Central America. To the 
contrary, dependency theorists argue, aggressive application of the policy device has been 
pivotal in shaping those nations' histories until revolution appears to be the only 
"instrument" capable o f breaking the hammerlock held by the local oligarchy and foreign 
capitalists.13 Latin America prosperity has not, and probably cannot be compatible with a 
policy device subordinate to United States economic and strategic interests. The policy 
device may be on its way out with the end o f the cold war and the contra war, and the 
beginning o f more socially beneficial conduits o f trade and investment from North 
America.
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LaFeber, in Inevitable Revolutions, illustrates and documents the historical record of 
how Central America became dependent on the United States. He acknowledges that 
mere economic power does not explain how the United States gained such control over 
the region. Other forms of power, political and military, accompanied the economic. If 
economic leverage proved incapable o f reversing trends that American elites feared (social 
revolution), these same officials wasted no time in applying military force to exterminate 
these threats. The United States has intervened frequently, with troops, administrative 
support and covert operations, to ensure that the technological conduits o f dependency 
remain intact. U.S warships occupied the waters o f the Gulf o f Fonseca in 1907, and 
again in 1910. U.S. Marines were stationed in Nicaragua from 1912-1934 in support o f 
various governments and policies. Augusto Cesar Sandino fought an air and ground 
war with the U.S. marines from 1927-1934 before being assassinated by Somoza I in 
1934. The U.S. created and forced the National Guard on Nicaragua, filling the political 
void left by the Marines.14 In the 1930’s Somoza I dramatically strengthened the role and 
powers o f the National Guard, as well as his own political power.
Nicaragua, during the 1960’s, was incredibly "stable" due to the ruthlessness o f the 
Somoza brothers. Political opponents were either shot, tortured or outmaneuvered. 
Kennedy's hopes for peaceful change were unrealistic. Political voices were often silenced 
in the "dungeon o f the Presidential Palace where electrodes of the infamous Little Machine 
were attached to their genitals for long sessions of torture."15 The United States embassy 
was next to the President's palace, indicating the symbolic but real feet that the U.S. 
ambassador was the second most important person in Nicaragua. In any event, during the
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Alliance for Progress, foreign aid skyrocketed.
Between 1961 and 1967, the Alliance authorized loans to Nicaragua totaling $50 
million. The Inter-American Development Bank injected another $50 million. Private 
enterprise did its part, as direct United States investment rose from $18 million to $75 
million.16 The resulting economic growth was spectacular. The GNP grew 6.2% 
annually, during the decade.17 However this level o f "prosperity" was experienced by only 
an elite few. As Alliance dollars poured in, agricultural exports streamed out, and no one, 
especially Washington officials, wanted to threaten "progress" by making the results more 
equitable.18 Cotton and coffee were the primary exports.
Cotton grew in its importance and so made the economy more vulnerable to market 
forces. It was devastating to the land and people, because the cotton boom evicted small 
farmers from their grain-producing lands and issued in another wave o f technological 
power over nature. Each cotton crop required numerous applications of unregulated 
pesticides. The agricultural labor force actually shrunk due to mechanized cotton pickers. 
The country turned from a net exporter to a net importer o f staple grains during this 
period.19 Those who could not find work in the cities tried to claim land for subsistence 
forming so they could have food in their bellies. By the mid-sixties, squatters occupied 
nearly 20% o f all farmland.20 Nicaraguans lost their capacity to feed themselves due to the 
structure o f the Alliance. During the mid-sixties the National Sandinista Liberation Front 
(FSLN) started to operate. They were especially strong in rural areas. The United States 
responded to this "threat" by increasing military aid and training to Nicaragua. Somoza 
already required all o f his officers to spend one year at the School o f the Americas in the
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Canal Zone for proper indoctrination and training. Somoza did everything that the United 
States asked for.
Prior to the Sandinista Revolution of 1979 the Nicaraguan economy was controlled 
by mainly three groups, the Somoza family, Banco de America, and Banco 
Nicaraguense.21 These groups, with the Somoza group having political hegemony, 
secured for themselves the benefits o f the country’s role in international trade as well as by 
their intimate relations with transnational corporations operating inside Nicaragua. This 
was accomplished through their financial power and monopoly over the domestic trade 
apparatus. They were able to build up a chain linking the small producers o f coffee, 
cotton, bananas, gold, silver etc. to the international markets for these products.22 Since 
the chain was monopolized, they were able to exploit the majority o f the workers by 
forcing them to sell low to the banks that in turn sold high on the international market.
This system served two purposes: it reinforced and perpetuated the technological 
and financial power of the three groups while at the same time it contributed to the 
political domination o f the majority by consolidating the hegemony of a small oligarchy, 
the point being that the technological apparatus o f foreign trade (an element o f the policy 
device) is far from a neutral apparatus or instrument, but a way in which the ruling elites 
can control and consolidate economic and political power. This trading system served to 
control and consolidate the assignment o f who was to be internal (the traders and bankers) 
and who external (workers) to the device. Further, the profits from foreign trade were 
either sent abroad and invested, or used for the consumption of luxury items few could 
afford. In both cases, foreign trade earnings generated by the laboring people were not
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applied toward the economic, social, or ecological development o f Nicaragua. These 
trade groups were both the filter and the bridge between the U.S. and Central America. 
The U.S. got the comfortable commodities; Nicaragua got the violence of the policy 
device.
Perhaps the most dangerous and lasting outcome o f the Somoza dynasty was the full 
transformation ofNicaragua into a perpetual external component o f the regional economy. 
As indicated in the last chapter, the FSLN saw the exploitation occurring due to trade 
arrangements and quickly moved to nationalize the banking system, foreign exchange and 
numerous industries, thereby creating a just new foreign exchange system. The FSLN was 
able to bring about some social gains 1980-1985, however the vast majority o f the 
population continued to register as externals locked in poverty. Nicaragua has yet to 
escape the neodependency syndrome through investment and a diversified economy. In 
feet, the war and debt crisis o f the 1980’s has imposed harsh realities on Central America 
in the 1990’s.
Due to the collapse o f regional economies in the 1980’s, governments could not 
generate the foreign exchange needed to pay their international debts or stimulate growth. 
In general, to obtain further international credit, governments are obligated to follow a 
combination o f macroeconomic policies prescribed by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), World Bank and the U.S. government. When they do, their debt payments are 
rescheduled and new loans are granted called “structural adjustment loans.”23 Countries 
are forced to choose from the structural adjustment menu of austerity measures, tax 
reform, monetary policies, export promotion and foreign investment. Unfortunately, the
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social effects o f structural adjustment fall most heavily on the shoulders of those who are 
least able to sustain it, the poor. Services o f concern to the rich and powerful such as 
major hospitals, prestige development projects and the military have not borne a 
proportionate share of the cuts in public spending.24 The services which have been most 
radically pruned are health services, free primary education and food subsidies- the 
services on which the poor are most dependent and which they have the least opportunity 
to replace by private means. I consider anyone living below the poverty line to be 
assigned as an external component o f the policy device. This continuing wrenching 
poverty, malnutrition and disease show again how difficult and burdensome it is to 
compete and operate in the global markets, and how improperly this burden M s on those 
assigned to the external side o f the policy device. Many Nicaraguans now work in 
assembly industries, known as “maquiladoras”, where low wages, government tax breaks 
and a willingness to suspend labor and environmental regulations are common. The 
Nicaraguan economy remains highly dependent on foreign capital. Thus the technological 
ties o f dependency again remain intact and as strong as ever. The high hopes of creating a 
relative^ autonomous and just economy guided by a progressive caring government 
probably seem like a distant dream. No matter what economic strategies are chosen, they 
are all inherently political because they involve issues o f power and choices about the 
distribution of resources in society and the world. Politics is subservient to technology. 
The policy device, which assigns people to external or internal status, seems to survive 
intact, independent o f political trends. Even where the free play o f market forces is 
demonstrably counter to the public interest, structural adjustment policies prevent the
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government from strongly intervening. In conjunction with severe structural adjustment 
programs, the U.S. government has promoted a laissez-faire development scheme that 
stresses free trade, deregulation and privatization. These have become additional 
conditions that Central America nations have had to meet in order to get economic 
assistance from their traditionally most important source -  the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID). Based on the exaggerated free market doctrines o f 
some conservative economists, this “neoliberal” development scheme emphasizes 
relinquishing government authority and completely “liberalizing” or opening up domestic 
economies to foreign investment, then integrating them into a world economy in which 
global markets dictate a country’s economic future without any provision for local control, 
protection, or regulation.25 The U.S. has yet to reciprocate completely and open up its 
own markets to all Central American and Caribbean exports. Instead it has provided 
special access to “non-traditional” exports such as maquilla-assembled clothing and winter 
vegetables. There are many substantive critiques of these types o f programs, most o f 
which are critical.26 Many alternative models o f development have been suggested, 
primarily by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Sustained progress in Central 
America will depend on governments and markets working in intelligent partnership with 
each other.
Assigning people to categories is fundamentally an ontological task. It has been 
called exploitation, oppression, imperialism, sexism, racism or other terms, but the 
significant event is ontological The Being of the person is compressed and ordered 
against their will. While not exactly slavery, the lack of respect for people’s feelings,
rights and aspirations can easily allow a lesser ontological designation into the external 
category. In the case o f slavery no notion of equal ontological or legal status is possible; 
people are property outright and can be bought and sold like cattle. Slavery is an extreme 
case, but I am sure many Central Americans thought o f themselves as slaves to this system 
they had no control over. The device paradigm is so enticing and attractive because is 
promises an end to the toil, misery and ignorance o f being on the external side of the 
policy device. What I have shown is that historically, the vast majority of Central 
Americans had no knowledge of the device paradigm because o f their long-standing status 
as external components o f an imperialistic policy device. The transition to becoming 
affluent enough to be a consumer (internal) comes only after long battles and the 
destruction o f many forms o f labor that only exist on the external side of the divide. This 
takes years of persistence and cultural change to adapt a culture to the device paradigm.
As indicated in the last chapter, some form o f social capital is required to see people 
through this difficult transition. For many countries, including Nicaragua unfortunately, 
this transition may never come. Prior to assigning, dividing, and patterning a society 
according to the device paradigm many assumptions have already been internalized. It is 
these philosophical assumptions that are examined in the following section on the ontology 
o f technology.
The substantive theory o f technology argues that technology constitutes a new type 
o f cultural system that restructures the social world as an object of control. The device 
paradigm modifies the substantive theory of technology in that it describes how 
technology transforms and deeply patterns everyday life and foreign affairs on the basis of
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human decisions or agreements. In forming and choosing to build a culture along the lines 
o f the device paradigm we are not only choosing to use machines but are allowing many 
profound cultural choices. Technology, in the form of the policy device, takes on more 
than a role o f mere means but becomes an environment and way o f life with a specific 
form and function; this is its substantive impact. While a machine may seem neutral, (it 
can be designed to do this or that), the web o f human activities and ecological cycles 
surrounding the machine and its support structure show technology as something that can 
not be easily put into a separate compartment. Today there are prodigious volumes of 
rules regulating the integration o f the machine into the social fabric, thus entrenching more 
and more the rule o f the device paradigm. Technology can become safer, cleaner and more 
efficient by design, as it is regulated. Any obstacle to technology can be quickly 
dispatched through further research and development. The technocratic outlook creates a 
single-minded unambiguous view of progress, o f problem-solving and social norms.
What Martin Heidegger did was uncover the primordial strength o f this approach 
and illustrate its universal appeal and brute power, cogently and philosophically. He did 
this, not without flaws by outlining how the technological restructuring o f society stems 
from the degradation of humans and Being to the level o f mere objects. While I 
acknowledge that the history o f western metaphysics has a substantial role in development 
o f technology, human choice always played an equally important role. I believe that 
technology will continue on its course but will not culminate in the complete subjugation 
o f humanity. Human beings can and will learn how to limit and attenuate the worst 
influences o f the ontology of technology. Human intelligence is needed to operate and
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maintain technology, so human conscience can always assert itself. Notions of “ought,” 
freedom, human rights, o f moral deliberation are always and ever opea This aspect, the 
ethical, is minimized by Heidegger. However, Heidegger’s insights are valued because he 
shows how deeply entrenched the problems are. War is not an inevitable outcome o f 
technology. This is exceedingly difficult to believe given the carnage of the twentieth 
century, and the absolute possibility o f nuclear annihilatioa
Heidegger correctly saw how technology would radically “en-frame” or limit social 
possibilities. The social structures supporting technology appear to be beyond any direct 
control. Nonetheless, determinate existence in a technological world, I believe, allows for 
human choice. Technology rips anything from its context and tries to “de-world” it, 
rendering it a lifeless object. What humans can bring to this process o f “de-worlding” is 
social mediation, the democratic process, so that the natural and social origins o f problems 
can be traced. The contra war illustrates the failure o f America to see itself as the origin 
o f war. The extremely easy attitude of simply allowing a war to progress without 
bothering to care, without “re-worlding” this gigantic machine describes elements o f the 
device paradigm.
Neodependency theory presupposes a technological appropriation of the world.
The ultimate goal o f United States policy in Central America is to very slowly transform 
workers into consumers, then aquaint them via television with commodities they can 
afford. There is intense pressure on Nicaragua to accept its destiny as another satellite of 
American technology. With this acceptance comes the entire ontology of technology.
The device paradigm is immanent. Since American technology has been at work in the
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region since the 1800's, this reality of a technologically specified society along the lines of 
the device paradigm is not a foreign idea or concept to Central Americans. In feet, most 
o f them would probably desire a more fully entrenched technological society. In Central 
America, technology in the form of the violent machinery of the external side of the device 
paradigm, exacerbates social problems since, as I have already shown, the levers of the 
machinery lie in the hands o f a powerful oligarchichal-military elite, and mainly this class 
o f people benefits from the system. Regular people service the machinery by working for 
the oligarchies as laborers, pickers, ranchers, etc., and most do not even have this much 
opportunity.
Built into the device paradigm, and thus the policy device, is an ontology of 
technology. Martin Heidegger has clarified this ontology in his essay “The Question 
Concerning Technology.” What Heidegger does in this essay is explode the mythos o f 
technology as mere means to an end and show that technology is a way o f revealing, o f 
truth. Heidegger uncovers the deep roots o f the modem age. He shows that technology 
infiltrates human existence and human knowing at a level more intimate than anything 
humans could create. This transformation of the human fundamentally distorts human 
actions mid aspirations. Machines can run amok and create disastrous situations. The 
transformative power of technology manifests itself not only in its explosive productivity 
but also in the way it normalizes human thinking. For Heidegger modem technology is a 
revealing that challenges nature to yield energy that can be stored ami transmitted. What 
does Heidegger mean by das Entbergen, the revealing?
The verb entbergen (to reveal) ami the noun Entbergung (revealing) are unique to
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Heidegger.27 Entbergen and Entbergung are formed from the verb bergen and the verbal 
prefix ent-. Bergen means to rescue, to secure, to harbor, to conceal. Ent- is used to 
connote a change from an existing condition; it can mean "forth" or "out" or can mean a 
change that is the negating o f a former condition. Entbergen connotes an opening out 
from protective concealing, a harboring forth. The Greeks used the word aletheia for 
revealing. Romans translate this with veritas, which we refer to as "truth." What 
Heidegger is after is a decisive, cogent analysis o f technology as a way o f revealing reality, 
o f opening up the "essence" of technology into full view.
"Technology” stems from the Greek technikon, which belongs to techne. Techne 
refers to artistic and poetic activity, it belongs to the process o f "bringing into appearance 
and imagery," a way o f bringing-forth, or poiesis. Physis also, the arising o f  something 
out o f itself, is a  bringing-forth, poiesis. What comes from out o f unconcealment, or 
presences by means of physis is poiesis "in the highest sense."28 The bursting open o f a 
seed pod, the cry o f a newborn baby, "the bursting o f a flower in bloom," an earthquake, 
are all spontaneous eruptions, examples o f bringing-forth, poiesis from inside itself en 
heautoi. What is brought forth by the artist or craftsperson by way of techne, in contrast, 
involves the play o f the fourfold modes o f occasioning, (the four causes) which together 
bring-forth the work of art. Techne, for the Greeks, was closely linked to espisteme which 
means knowing "in the widest sense." To know, is to be at home in something, to 
understand it, to be expert in it. Such knowing provides the occasion for "an opening up" 
and as such is a revealing.
Heidegger begins his inquiry with the four Aristotelian causes: (1) causa materialis
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the matter out o f which things are made; (2) causa formalism the form or shape into which 
the material enters; (3) causa Jinalis, the end that bounds and circumscribes the full realm 
of the thing that is being made, that which bounds or completes, in this sense, is typically 
called in Greek telos, which is usually translated as "aim" or "purpose"; (4) causa 
efficiens, the person responsible for integrating, or bringing about, the actual finished 
thing. The four causes are all "co-responsible" in the bringing-forth o f the artwork, house, 
ship or sword. Each o f the four causes, in this Greek sense, is responsible for bringing 
something into appearance; Heidegger, calls this Greek experience o f responsibility the 
"occasioning" or aitia, the "essence" of causality as the Greeks thought i t29 Occasioning 
in this sense takes on a much richer and complex meaning than that o f merely signifying 
that an event took place.
With the onset o f modem science, the "occasioning" o f the fourfold causality has 
been stripped down to a strict interpretation as instrumental rationality. Likewise, 
technology as a human activity, as a way o f positing the ends and procuring the means to 
achieve them, has seemingly been reduced to something value-neutral and instrumental.
As such, technology is simply an extension of human capacities through neutral artifacts. 
Armaments, roads and machines can thus be considered "value neutral". Technology, in 
this view, is the conflation of causa materialis and causa fm alis made subservient to 
narrowly defined human needs and ends.
Technology as instrument necessitates a search for what or whom guides its 
expansion. What values or politics guide technology? With regard to Central America, I 
so for have shown that a policy device, organized in Washington, has historically assigned
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Central America to the status o f an external exploitable resource. According to the 
socialist critique, the ultimate ends that technology serves is the welfare o f the ruling elite, 
which controls the policy device through various means, and the exploitation o f the 
working class and the environment; social progress would depend on manipulating 
technology in the proper manner as means. Technology is something that the Sandinistas 
"took" control over, but in so doing supposedly attached a deep humanity to it. This is the 
socialist argument. Resources were often used locally, rather than exported Exports and 
imports were minimized and many industries were nationalized. United States 
multinationals either left or were urged to consider the new Sandinista labor and 
environmental laws if they stayed on. Business wasnt the same anymore. The FSLN 
attempted to control the technological substrata to feed more people, educate them and 
keep them healthy. As shown in Chapter 2, this approach was partially wrong and thus 
unsuccessful in regulating the economy, in spurring private investment and in establishing 
social justice.
But prior to analyzing by whom or how instrumental technology is guided or 
managed, technology has already transformed our perceptions of what is real. The 
revealing that rules in modem technology is characterized as a challenging,
Herausfordem. Herausfordem is composed of the verb fordem  which means to demand, 
to summon or to challenge, and the adverbial prefixes her (hither) and aus (out).
Together Herausfordem means to challenge, to call forth or summon to action, to demand 
positively, to provoke.30 Technology challenges or provokes "nature” (insert Nicaragua 
for nature) to supply energy that can be extracted and stored. "Nature" comes under the
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sway o f a setting-in-order that sets upon, stellt, nature in order for it to yield energy. 
Agriculture is United Fruit banana plantations guarded by the military. Stellen, in this 
sense, is an aggressive "setting-upon" which is inherently a setting in place so as to supply.
This setting-upon that challenges forth the energies o f nature is an 
expediting Fordem, and in two ways. It expedites in that it unlocks and 
exposes. Yet that expediting is always itself directed from the beginning 
toward furthering something else, i.e., toward driving on to the maximum 
yield at the minimum expense.31
The earth no longer "stands" before us but is "ordered to stand by, to be immediately at 
hand."32 Whatever energy concealed in nature is unlocked, exposed and immediately 
transformed. Genetic engineering is a decoding, an unlocking o f the mysteries o f hair 
color, height, dexterity, etc., but it is also an "engineering," for its intentions are to re-code 
and manipulate human fetuses, human potentials, for further ordering. The more 
engineering that is accomplished the further and deeper the revealing entrenches itself. 
Engineering research exposes its "own manifoldly interlocking paths"33 which are 
immediately seized upon by business and the academy as yielding potential profit or 
publication.
Whatever is on call for further ordering, like the Nicaraguan rainforest or the human 
genome, has a certain way o f standing. Heidegger calls it the "standing-reserve."34 To be 
a standing-reserve (resource) is to be forever on call, in place or standing by, available for 
use as mere stock. Standing-reserve designates a way in which reality is present according 
to the challenging demanded by the revealing o f technology. What is on standing-reserve
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is no longer something which stands in its own right but is part of an ontology that already 
has plans for its transformation, distribution and control.
For Heidegger, Western culture has been decisively claimed by this way o f 
revealing. Technology controls how the "real shows itself or withdraws." As technology 
is driven forward over every indigenous culture on earth, humans take part in the ordering 
and controlling of the other. This way of appropriating reality which has claimed the 
planet Heidegger calls Ge-stell, or enframing, the "essence" of technology.35
The framework or enframing, includes modem science and the entire industrial 
apparatus. Science entraps nature so as to exhibit it as a calculable coherence o f forces in 
advance. Research orders experiments to be performed precisely for the purpose o f 
asking, and verifying, how nature reveals itself when set up in this way.36 Engineers 
design apparatus, which exploit scientific findings. These findings create the possibility o f 
new devices. Market forces distribute devices for consumption to the masses at maximum 
profit. In socialist countries the state takes over planning and distribution; the underlying 
ontology is the same.
“The way o f unconcealment itself, within which ordering unfolds, is never a human 
handiwork.”37 When nature reveals itself according to the enframing, the person has been 
claimed by a way o f revealing that challenges the person to approach, and appropriate, 
nature as an object o f research. Nature as real, becomes standing-reserve, due to the way 
in which it shows itself. The enframing is a gathering-upon, which challenges us to reveal 
the real in the mode of ordering. Technological activity, such as building dams, 
assembling engines and so forth is a response to the challenging forth o f the enframing.
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All o f nature and humanity must be managed. A group may think they are simply 
transforming neutral material in a technical fashion as means to an end. Prior to this 
physical transformation o f nature into object and energy, the enframing, the controlling 
way of revealing the real has claimed the group.
For Heidegger, where the enframing reigns, there is danger in the highest sense, 
extreme danger-the danger being that the enframing will blot out or displace all other 
forms o f truth, o f revealing, o f being claimed. All o f technology, for Heidegger, is a 
danger. There are two crucial kinds o f danger within technology. The “external” dangers 
o f disease and starvation for those designated as external, and the “internal” danger o f 
moral callousness, for the internal. Assigning people to the external or assigning oneself 
to the internal elements o f the policy device is inherently injurious because either assigning 
Mis to allow for freedom o f allowing a group to organize itself and its relations with 
nature appropriately. Where the enframing reigns, nature and people are resources first, 
and beautiful and insightful only after much deliberate reflection. The stability and global 
spread o f the device paradigm is a monumental social indicator o f how deeply the 
enframing has been internalized. Without the enframing, the device paradigm, in either its 
external or internal component, would be unintelligible, unimaginable. The enframing, to 
the contrary, creates a rich field o f possibility. In this century, with respect to Central 
America, this field o f possibility took the form of exploitation and imperialism.
Indifference is an attitude in which the other simply does not matter and his or her 
suffering and joys are o f absolutely no consequence. By assigning Nicaragua to the role o f 
external resource, Nicaragua is disregarded as an equal. Indifference corresponds to the
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internal side o f the device paradigm. The ontological status of external resource allows 
for indifference. By introverting all attention upon projects that benefit U.S. interests 
alone, the presence of others is reduced to that o f mere objects. The unique existence of 
the other is subordinated, minimized and objectified to the far greater concern of 
maintaining power relations and profit.
Since Thomas Jefferson, the U.S. has never given up on its desire to indirectly 
control the politics o f Central America. In this sense the U.S. remains attached to Central 
America. On the other hand, the appropriation o f Nicaragua as an external resource is 
inauthentic and thus allows for deep cultural indifference. The policy device, in this 
instance, is organized violence. The structure o f the policy device allows those on the 
internal side o f the device to reap the benefits o f the device paradigm, they get a politics 
devoted to affluence. Individuals on the internal side o f the device are not held 
accountable, but should be, for the organized violence o f the external side o f the device. 
Linkages between the two exist but are often legally sanctioned. In this manner the policy 
device desensitizes people on the internal side; it makes no demands to think morally but 
provides an infinite array of commodious devices that are quickly and easily consumed.
When the Sandinistas took power from Somoza in 1979, the U.S. reacted swiftly 
and violently. When people have historically been treated as objects, their manipulation 
and murder in times of war is easy. The following chapter shows how making people into 
an external resource of the device paradigm leads to violence, terror and war. Conflict 
can escalate to such an extent that one side or the other is decimated beyond repair. In 
this extreme situation war is incompatible with the smooth running o f the technological
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machinery. Since the U.S. desires to continue, in the long run, the technological 
appropriation of Nicaragua, the contra war was not carried to out to a cataclysmic 
extreme. Congressional oversight and votes on the house floor indicate that there were 
deep reservations, in certain quarters, about the direction and purpose o f the contra war. 
The U.S. never invaded. However, the contra war was a disaster for Nicaragua, as the 
following chapter will show.
Before I go on to the structure o f the contra war I need to comment on the policy 
device and how it is distinguished from the device paradigm. The policy device divides 
and assigns people according to ontological status. The policy device is permeated by 
local and regional politics and assigns people often for strategic or national interests. The 
structure and functions o f a policy device indicates its philosophical and ontological 
assumptions. The political frameworks o f the players who forge a policy device are 
critical A policy device is politically open in this sense. Alternative development models, 
forms of aid and advice will differ according to the politics of the countries, which control 
and participate in the device. For example, Sweden sent technicians to Nicaragua during 
the contra war to help in agriculture and other areas. Wisconsin and Nicaragua are Sister 
States and have ongoing positive relations. These are examples of humane policy 
devices. Alternative conduits have always been present. It is just that the policy device I 
described completely overwhelmed any small-scale direct material aid or cultural exchange 
because o f its scope and economic power.
The device paradigm describes a complete form of civilization. There is inequality 
in the cultures devoted to the device paradigm but little disagreement as to what
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constitutes our aspirations as a people. Those on the lowest rungs of society can see the 
broad middle class and aspires to those standards. Development o f the device paradigm is 
constrained by democratic processes, imperfect as they are. In cultures devoted to 
affluence, over the long term, there is a slight inclination toward social justice, in order for 
those designated internal to realize pieces o f the promise o f technology, and to grow in 
numbers. The device paradigm is an entrenched and socially vibrant phenomenon strong 
enough to undermine politics. The policy devices necessary to support the paradigm are 
only constrained by regional geopolitics and are thus variable between humane and 
oppressive, depending on the politics o f the sponsoring country. The oppressive policy 
device o f imperialism is only one small, but important, element o f the U.S. device 
paradigm. The contra war is a logical extension o f imperialism and, it too had 
characteristics o f a device.
Chapter 4
Internal and External Elements of the Contra W ar
As stated in Chapter 1, there is a basic structure to war. In war, the shared activity 
is injuring, and the participants must work to out-injure each other. Both sides inflict 
injuries. The side that inflicts greater injury faster will be the winner, or to say it another 
way, the side that is more massively injured or believes itself to be so will be the loser.
The qualification “believes itself’ is an important one, for countries will differ in the level 
o f injury that represents the borderline between tolerable and intolerable damage. Each 
side begins the war by perceiving physical damage as acceptable and ideological and 
territorial sacrifices as unacceptable. Through war each side tries to bring about in the 
other the fundamental perceptual reversal - damage as unacceptable, and sacrifices or 
ideological change as acceptable.1 The terms “out-injuring” or the phrase “each side 
works to out injure the other” means “each side works to bring the other side to the 
latter’s perceived level of intolerable injury faster than it is itself brought to its own level 
of intolerable injury.”2 It is the activity of injuring that is the substantive and determining 
act o f war. Strategy, policy initiatives, diplomacy, medical and logistical needs all 
contribute to war and directly contribute to one side’s ability to out-injure the other side. 
These activities, however ingenious and cunning they may be, do not describe the 
determining activity of the contest. These support activities are all subsumed into massive, 
intense feats o f out-injuring the other.
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The flow of the United States funded arms and logistical/training support to 
Nicaraguan armies has a long and colorful history. What was crucial and intelligent about 
the Reagan administration’s strategy was that U.S. troops never engaged in battle directly. 
The Reagan administration was able to get the better o f the enemy with little loss of 
political capital. In other words, an extremely successful strategy is one in which the 
decision is brought about without a battle. A slightly less successful strategy, still very 
successful and what the Reagan administration actually did, is one in which the injuring 
occurs in only one direction. On the battlefield of course there was two-directional 
injuring. However, there were so many layers o f command, management, government, 
and physical geography between our surrogate fighting force, the contras, and the U.S. 
populace that in reality the contra war was one-directional in this sense. Only their side, 
the Nicaraguan side, was injured.
The policy device that guided the contra war had discernible structures and 
purposes. Initiatives against the Sandinistas were multifaceted, and matured and changed 
over time and in response to congressional criticism; however the fact must not be 
forgotten that injuring of Nicaragua was the sole purpose of each facet. A device, 
following Borgmann, once designed and in use, does not engage or even permit 
engagement.3 On the external side (the receiving side), the contra war policy device 
procured for the U.S. terror, political intimidation, destruction and death: violence against 
people, violence against things and violence against ideology. On the internal side, the 
policy device procured only information, press releases and some political drama 
surrounding aid to the contras and the Iran-Contra hearings o f 1987. This suggests that
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engagement with the machinery of foreign affairs is unintended, its actual workings are 
rarely and reluctantly opened for public debate. It is interesting to note that the Iran- 
Contra hearings focused on the illegalities o f the internal side of the policy device and not 
the injuring which occurred in the external element.
There were two significant differences between the policy devices of imperialism and 
of the contra war. Under imperialism, Somoza’s political and economic clout and the 
Guardia were necessary, but not sufficient conditions, to create and maintain a 
neodependent economy and an oppressed workforce. U.S. markets, U.S. military and 
economic aid, and U.S. political guidance were also necessary for imperialistic policies to 
flourish over time. Under imperialism there has to be a national government willing to act 
in a broad but concerted fashion as the local wing of the internal component o f the device 
while also ensuring that the external component of the device was under control. With the 
fall of Somoza and the dissolution o f the Guardia, the local national component of the 
internal side of the divide also seemingly vanished. The loss of the Guardia and its vast 
network of informers created a huge political void and much anxiety both within and 
outside Nicaragua. Almost immediately, ex-Guardia regrouped in Honduras and began 
planning to overthrow the new government. The contra war was an attempt to recreate a 
new national component o f the internal side o f the policy device. Imperialism relies on the 
maintenance of historic centers of power. The contras and their supporters were tapped 
by the U.S. to re-assume that role. The Sandinistas were not allowed to be that power 
base because of their untested and dubious loyalty to the inhuman mechanisms o f a 
neodependent state. The second crucial difference was that imperialism requires a routine
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and predictable, although cruel, method of extracting and trading goods and raw materials 
for the purpose of economic control whereas in the strategies of the contra war the 
purpose was to radically disrupt the extraction and distribution of goods and raw 
materials, and the movement of people, until a new regime could assume power. The 
U.S. felt so strongly that the FSLN could not function as either their internal national 
partner, or as a controllable external component, that only a multifaceted terror campaign 
could set things right again.
There were five basic elements to the implementation of the contra war, as far as one 
can tell from the literature: (1) A contra fighting force was armed and trained and sent into 
Nicaragua on a regular basis to fight Sandinista troops. (2) FSLN social programs and 
infrastructure were targeted by the contras such as health clinics, cooperatives and 
schools, and important bridges. (3) Civilians and Sandinista officials were assassinated, 
threatened, kidnapped and tortured. (4) The Nicaraguan economy was disrupted by the 
war, a U.S. embargo (1985-1990) and pressure on international lending agencies not to 
extend credit to Nicaragua. (5) There was an ongoing “disinformation” campaign (i.e. 
official lying) regarding Nicaragua. Contras were consistently referred to as “democrats,” 
“the moral equivalents of our founding fathers,” and “Freedom Fighters,” by Ronald 
Reagan, in direct contradiction to their actual conduct in the field. These are examples of 
renaming injuring, and thus rendering invisible, the true purpose of war. Unfocussed 
attacks on Nicaragua such as the mining of harbors and the strategic placement of 
landmines in rural areas, along footpaths and in roads, also occurred. There were many 
initiatives to subvert the Sandinistas, but most fall into these five broad categories. In its
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totality, the contra war was a terrorist attack on Nicaragua inflicted under U.S. guidance 
and funding. It was clear, as determined by the world court and other third parties, that 
most of these activities were illegal and broke numerous national and international laws 
and applicable laws of war. Still, the U.S. pressed on.
Earlier I described war as an intense form of work focused on injuring the enemy. 
Later on I spoke about war as a contest seeking ideological and political changes. The 
contra war intimately contained both of these aspects and one more - the proxy fighting 
force. The political changes sought through injury and contest took place only in the 
external domain o f the policy device. Internal elements designed and waged war easily and 
unobtrusively due to their political, historical and geographical status in the region. The 
U.S., since it was operating a clandestine operation outside Nicaragua and the law, never 
had to have its policies formally authorized by internal Nicaraguan political groups or the 
Nicaraguan legislature. Components o f this policy device were thus freefloating, 
untethered to moral or judicial constraint. Since local political approval was not necessary, 
it was also unconnected, and therefore uncommitted, to any specific geographical region.
It had no popular political base in Nicaragua. Violence waged was calculated and 
focused. To the recipients (external domain) it appeared random, irrational yet blatantly 
politically motivated. In America, no injuring occurred directly, it was only reported. The 
U.S. consolidated and focused its immense political, financial and military prowess to fight 
a war few Americans believed in or understood. Their spear carrier was a proxy army 
composed of counterrevolutionaries, or contras, who not only cushioned the U.S. from 
injury but added political legitimacy to the U.S. cause because the contra war could be
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portrayed as a “civil” war, largely motivated and controlled by internal political pressure 
and not from without. There was political support for the contras within Nicaragua.
It is interesting to note that during the contra war Nicaragua openly embraced a 
deluge o f aid from numerous governments and NGOs. In particular, members and staff 
from American NGOs who worked in Nicaragua at the time were not merely tolerated, 
but publicly welcomed. This shows that the FSLN itself could also assign and divide 
according to the device paradigm. People, groups and governments that provided 
empathy, or material, financial and administrative support to the people o f Nicaragua were 
viewed as in solidarity with their struggle and thus designated as external. It was common 
to hear Nicaraguans plead with visiting Americans to help stop the war. The FSLN, and 
many Nicaraguans, instead of blaming the visitors, divided American citizenry from its 
own government and thus disburdened them from direct responsibility and guilt for U.S. 
actions. There was no attempt to exact revenge on Americans. The old saw was: we like 
you, but not your government. However, this neglects the deep connections between 
people and their governments. Visiting Americans had the good fortune to transfer from 
the war zones to America (external to internal element) with relative ease just as they 
crossed the invisible boundary between work and leisure. Returning Americans who 
spoke out against the contra war were often labeled as biased, soft, and politically naive. 
Fellow internals, especially yuppies (this was the decade of greed and excess) were 
incredulous at the protesters and simply wished them out existence. There was money to 
be made, no time for reflection. Further, the U.S. government, for almost the entire war, 
prohibited Sandinista officials and Nicaraguan cultural groups from visiting the U.S. to
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speak directly with politicians or citizens. Thus the voices o f the external element were 
easily overwhelmed by the internal element which bombarded the press and public with 
almost daily press releases, reports and sanctions from the bully pulpit of the highest office 
in the land. Because of their continued status as external components of the policy device 
and their refusal to bend to U.S. demands, Nicaraguans were pummeled into submission 
or in the words o f Ronald Reagan, forced to “cry uncle.”4
The Reagan administration justified its hostile policies toward the Sandinista 
revolution with four claims: (1) that Nicaragua’s military buildup jeopardized the security 
of its neighbors, (2) that the political regime the Sandinistas were creating was 
undemocratic, (3) that Nicaragua was an ally of Cuba and the Soviet Union, and therefore, 
a threat to the United States, and (4) that Nicaragua was actively supporting revolutionary 
movements in neighboring countries.5
The first two were clearly pseudo-issues, after the fact rationalizations for American 
policy. The Sandinista military, initially modest, grew in direct response to contra attacks 
and remained, in the words o f a classified CIA report, “primarily defense oriented.” 
Nicaragua has minimal capacity to project force outside its own borders. The U.S. 
attitude toward the 1984 elections, in which the U.S. pressured Contra spokesman Arturo 
Cruz to withdraw, suggested that the administration was more interested in defeating the 
Sandinistas than in building democracy. The third and fourth issues form the real core of 
U.S. concerns in Nicaragua and deserve closer examination.
The Sandinista had warm relations with Cuba and the Soviet Union since the 
beginning of the revolution. But the Contra policy and American efforts to isolate
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Nicaragua economically pushed the country into greater dependence on Soviet-bloc 
military and economic aid. Initially, the Soviet Union and its East European allies became 
Nicaragua’s arms suppliers because the U.S. pressured its own allies not to sell arms to 
the Sandinistas. Pentagon data indicated that Soviet-bloc deliveries were relatively small 
through 1981, but surged as the covert war escalated in 1982 and thereafter. In 1984, the 
Soviet-bloc supplied $250 million in munitions to Nicaragua, up from only $5 million in 
1979 and $7 million in 1980.6 There were 300 to 500 Soviet and Cuban military advisors 
in the country in 1987, along with 700 non-military advisors.7 As Western development 
credits were cut off, Soviet-bloc financing of the Nicaraguan economy expanded from 25 
percent of external financing in 1981 to 85 percent in 1984.®
Since the beginning of the revolution the Cubans generously supported Sandinista 
social programs. Cuba sent over 1,000 educators to help with the 1980 Literacy Crusade, 
modeled on the 1961 Cuban experience.9 By 1982, there were about 2,000 Cuban 
teachers in Nicaragua, many o f them working in remote areas and nearly 1,000 doctors, 
nurses, and other medical personnel.10 Cuba built a 150-bed hospital in Managua and 
provided advanced training on the island for Nicaraguan doctors in such areas as public 
health. The Cubans also provided economic and technical aid in areas where they had 
expertise, including road construction, fishing, mining, poultry rearing, and sugar 
production. It must be made clear that there were limits to the Soviets’ and Cubans’ 
willingness to back the Sandinistas. Soviet oil flow was temporarily suspended in 1987. 
The Soviets, Cubans, and Americans all understood that the Cubans and Soviets would 
not come to Nicaragua’s defense in the event o f an American invasion.11
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U.S. complaints about the growth of the Sandinista military and the Soviet-bloc 
presence in Nicaragua is perhaps secondary to the U.S. concern about the Sandinistas 
alleged “export” o f revolution to neighboring countries. The National Directorate’s 
decision to support the Salvadoran rebel’s ill-fated January 1981 offensive was, in fact, 
taken reluctantly and under extraordinary conditions.12 The Salvadorans approached the 
Sandinista leadership for help in mid-1980 when the military and associated death squads 
in their country were murdering hundreds o f people o f quite varied political complexions 
every month. In March, Archbishop Oscar Romero o f San Salvador, who had denounced 
the killings, was gunned down as he was saying Mass. In desperation, political moderates 
were joining the armed resistance, and El Salvador seemed to be heading for the sort of 
popular insurrection that had finally toppled the Somoza dictatorship. The Sandinistas had 
received help from moderate governments in Costa Rica and Venezuela under similar 
circumstances, but now the Nicaraguans were worried about compromising their relations 
with the United States if they helped the Salvadoran insurrection.
After some hesitation, the National Directorate agreed to help, but several months 
passed before the arms began to flow from Nicaragua to El Salvador in significant 
quantities. The change came with the election of Ronald Reagan in November 1980 on a 
platform that suggested rolling back the revolutions in Nicaragua and elsewhere. At this 
point, the Sandinistas felt they had little to lose and might enhance their own imperiled 
security by helping to bring a friendly regime to power.
After the collapse o f the January 1981 offensive in El Salvador, Nicaraguan 
assistance was apparently halted when the Sandinistas thought they had an understanding
with the Reagan administration about restarting U.S. aid. There is no evidence that the 
flow of arms later resumed. At the time, Salvadoran guerillas did not need outside 
supplies to survive. The rebels relied largely on munitions captured or illegally purchased 
from Salvadoran government sources.
All four issues outlined above were discussed openly and in high level diplomatic 
talks between the U.S. and Nicaragua throughout the 1980’s. The fact is that the U.S. 
throughout the contra war outright rejected all Nicaraguan peace proposals. The injuring 
had to continue. Since Nicaragua was an external resource, and a socialist one at that, its 
ideas were never given equal weight and consideration. Brutality and indifference to 
brutality reigned.
The early contra war relied upon a three- sided arrangement, “La Tripartita.” The 
U.S. supplied directions and money, Argentina provided training and cover, and Honduras 
was the main base o f operations. Following the March 1981 Presidential finding on 
Central America, State Department ambassador-at-large Vernon “Dick” Walters (later UN 
Ambassador) was dispatched to negotiate agreements with the contras and the 
Argentineans. Walters, a retired lieutenant general who speaks eight languages including 
Spanish, has a long career in covert operations involving him in such affairs as the 1953 
overthrow of the Mossadegh government in Iran, the 1964 overthrow of the Goulart 
government in Brazil, and the 1973 overthrow of the Allende government in Chile.13
Walters personally negotiated the merger of the September 15th Legion and the 
UDN (Nicaraguan Democratic Union) into a new organization called the Fuerza 
Democratica Nigaraguense (Nicaraguan Democratic Force, or by its Spanish acronym,
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F.D.N.).14 At that time, the ex-National Guardsmen were divided into several small bands 
operating along the Nicaragua-Honduras border. The largest and most deadly band was 
the September 15th Legion. These bands were poorly equipped and unorganized. They 
were not an effective fighting force. The UDN was a moderate group headed by Jose 
Francisco “Chicano” Cardenal.
According to Edgar Chamorro, a contra official, Cardenal and the UDN initially 
opposed any linkage with the guardsmen. The CIA and high-ranking U.S. officials 
insisted on the merge with the Guardsmen. The UDN was well aware o f the crimes 
committed by the Guardsmen against the Nicaraguan people while in the service of 
President Somoza. However, the UDN recognized that without help from the U.S. 
government, there was no chance of removing the Sandinistas from power. So the UDN 
eventually acceded to the CIA and General Walters’ insistence that it join forces with the 
Guardsmen. Walters himself arranged for all the bands to be incorporated into the 
September 15th Legion and for the military government of Argentina to send several army 
officers as advisors and trainers.15
Edgar Chamorro described the merger o f the September 15th Legion and the UDN:
....on August 10, 1981 it was accomplished ... at a meeting in Guatemala 
City, Guatemala, where the formal documents were signed. The meeting 
was arranged and the documents prepared by the CIA. The new 
organization was called Fuenza Democratic Nicaraguense (Nicaraguan 
Democratic Force) or, by its Spanish acronym F.D.N. It was to be headed 
by a political junta consisting of Cardenal, Arestides Sanchez (a politician 
loyal to General Somoza and closely associated with Bermudez) and 
Mariano Mendoza, formerly a labor leader in Nicaragua. The political 
junta soon established itself in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, taking up residence 
in a house rented for it by the CIA. Bermudez was assigned to head the
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military general staff and it too was based in Honduras. The name of the 
organization, the members o f the political junta, and the members of the 
general staff were all chosen or approved by the CIA. Soon after the 
merger, the FDN began to receive a substantial and steady flow of 
financial, military, and other assistance from the CIA. Former National 
Guardsmen who had sought exile in El Salvador, Guatemala, and the 
United States were recruited to enlarge the military component of the 
organization. They were offered regular salaries, the funds for which were 
supplied by the CIA. Training was provided by Argentinean military 
officers, two of whom Col. Oswaldo Ribeiro and Col. Santiago Villejas I 
got to know quite well. The Argentineans were paid by the CIA. A 
special unit was created for sabotage, especially demolitions. It was 
trained directly by CIA personnel at Lepaterique, near Tegucigalpa. Arms, 
ammunitions, equipment, and food were supplied by the CIA. Our first 
combat units were sent into Nicaragua territory in December 1981.16
A command structure was established with formal direction from the CIA. Funds and 
expertise from prior covert actions were funneled into the contra cause. Reagan signed a 
National Security Decision Directive on November 23, 1981 authorizing the CIA to 
“Work with foreign governments as appropriate” to conduct political and “paramilitary” 
operations “against (the) Cuban presence and Cuban-Sandinista support infrastructure in 
Nicaragua and elsewhere in Central America.”17 The CIA was allocated $19.95 million to 
build a 500-man force in Honduras that would complement a 1,000-man force being 
trained in Argentina.18 Washington reportedly paid Argentina $50 million to provide the 
training.19
When presenting the finding to the Intelligence Committees, administration officials 
emphasized arms interdiction. Casey said the United States was “buying in” to an existing 
Argentine operation to train Nicaraguan exiles. By one account, “the impression left with 
some members of the Intelligence Committees was of crack teams of commandos hitting
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arms caches, ammunition dumps, Cuban military patrols, and a couple of key bridges 
along the arms supply route in the dead of night and withdrawing unseen from Nicaragua 
to their Honduran bases.”20
Illegal shipments o f arms from Miami to Honduras continued unimpeded. General 
advice on how to smuggle weapons out of Miami was provided by CIA officials. The aim 
of administrative policy was to draw the line in El Salvador and redraw it in Nicaragua.
The press was, at the time, told that the U.S. was supporting only political “moderates” 
and that “no support would be given to followers o f General Somoza.”21
In March o f 1982, two key bridges were destroyed by contras. The Sandinistas 
reacted by declaring a state o f emergency that mandated prior censorship o f military 
information, restricted the right to strike, and limited freedom of movement in the war 
zones. The armed forces were put on lull alert. U.S. officials denounced the state of 
emergency they had provoked as a sign of Nicaraguan totalitarianism. There were no 
reminders that every government, no matter how democratic, employs extraordinary 
measures in times of war including the U.S. In May of 1982, CIA officials confirmed U.S. 
involvement in the plot to blow up the bridges.22 This effected no objection from the 
House Intelligence Committee as the bridges were thought to support illicit arms traffic 
from Nicaragua to the guerillas in El Salvador. “We had to do that,” one member said.
Throughout 1982 the contra war expanded in scope and sophistication. Mercenaries 
from throughout the world were recruited for missions in Central America.23 Contra 
forces assassinated many minor Nicaraguan government officials.24 A customs warehouse 
was burned. From March 14 to June 21, 1982, there were at least 106 insurgent incidents
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(by contra forces) within Nicaragua.23 Buildings were destroyed, crops were burned, and 
health officials killed. The U.S. held numerous exercises with warships off the Nicaraguan 
coasts. U.S. spy planes often flew over Nicaragua in violation of Nicaraguan airspace. 
Airstrips were enlarged in Honduras and Costa Rica.
As former contra spokesman Edgar Chamorro explained to the World Court,
1982 was a year of transition for the FDN ... from a collection of small, 
disorganized and ineffectual bands of ex-National guardsmen, the FDN 
grew into a well-organized, well-armed, well-equipped, and well-trained 
fighting force o f approximately 4,000 men capable of inflicting great harm 
on Nicaragua. This was due entirely to the CIA which organized, armed, 
equipped, trained, and supplied us...After the initial recruitment o f ex- 
Guardsmen from throughout the region (to serve as officers or 
commanders o f military units), efforts were made to recruit ‘foot soldiers’ 
for the force from inside Nicaragua. Some Nicaraguans joined the force 
voluntarily, either because of dissatisfaction with the Nicaraguan 
government, family ties with leaders o f the force, promises o f food, 
clothing, boots, and weapons or a combination of these reasons. Many 
other members o f the force were recruited forcibly. FDN units would 
arrive at an undefended village, assemble all the residents in the town 
square and then proceed to kill, in full view of the others, all persons 
suspected of working for the Nicaraguan government or the FSLN, 
including police, local militia members, party members, health workers, 
teachers, and farmers from government-sponsored cooperatives. In this 
atmosphere, it was not difficult to persuade those able-bodied men left 
alive to return with the FDN units to their base camps in Honduras and 
enlist in the force. This was, unfortunately, a widespread practice that 
accounted for many recruits.26
In Tinotega, there was a contra commander known as “El Tigrillo” (little tiger). “He had 
a reputation of being a rapist, recruiting people by force ... a very abusive person. There 
were other commanders who had the reputation of intimidating people - ‘if you don’t join, 
we kill you.’” There was one more group of recruits, they were just “adventurers that join
anything that goes by and promises a new, better life ... or some are just bored with life .
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or they see an opportunity to leave their wife with children like they’ve done before.”27 
The contras reportedly also recruited unemployed Hondurans.
In July o f 1981, Eden Pastora, a prominent Sandinista war hero, resigned his post as 
Nicaraguan National Chief o f the People’s Militia and Deputy Minister of Defense and 
went underground. He emerged in April of 1982, denouncing the Sandinista leadership 
and vowing to overthrow them. By July 1982, he was on the CIA payroll and in charge of 
the southern front.28 Pastora did not fit well within the FDN hierarchy. Contra leaders, 
Bermudez and Lau, stationed in Honduras, wanted him dead. The Nicaraguan people 
condemned Pastora and held large rallies in Managua portraying him as a traitor to the 
people and the revolution with no concern for the national sovereignty o f Nicaragua.
The war between the British and the Argentines severed the Argentine-Contra 
connection when the U.S. publicly backed the British. The war ended June 14, 1982 with 
a British military victory. In the wake of defeat, the Argentine military dictatorship gave 
way to an elected government. The Argentine military withdrew their contra advisers.
The FDN amassed a long record of atrocities against Nicaraguan citizens and little 
public support inside or outside Nicaragua. Like death swooping down, the contra killed 
and intimidated the Nicaraguan populace with U.S. supplied arms. There are numerous 
books on this topic which are well researched, notably Contra Terror In Nicaragua: 
Report o f  a Fact-finding Mission: September 1984-January 1985, by Reed Brody, a U.S. 
lawyer who documents hundreds o f contra attacks.29 Many of the 145 legally sufficient 
affidavits Brody obtained were independently verified by news sources like The New York 
Times1 Americas Watch and CBS Evening News. Christopher Dickey, a journalist, lived
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and traveled with the contras throughout 1983, and later published a brilliant and 
penetrating account, With The Contras: A Reporter in the Wilds o f  Nicaragua.30 Other 
first hand sources are Blood o f  The Innocent: Victims o f  the Contras ’ War in Nicaragua 
31 by Toefilo Cabestrero, a Spanish Priest and journalist, and The Contras: Interviews with 
Anti-Sandinistas authored by Dieter Eich, a German engineer and sociologist and Carlos 
Rinchon, humanities scholar.32
The F.D.N. command structure was dominated by ex-Guardia.33 Advice and 
direction came from the CIA “There were always two tracks” a CIA official explained, 
“the publicly stated CIA objective o f interdicting weapons to the Salvadoran guerillas and 
the overthrow of the Sandinista government.”34 “It would have defied logic for anyone to 
think that the sole purpose o f the anti-Sandinista soldier was to intercept arms traveling 
down a trail.”35
By 1983, there were numerous documented assassinations by contra forces and the 
CIA felt compelled to commission a manual on Psychological Operations in Guerilla 
Warfare.30 The cover story was falling apart and Congress was getting testy. The 
business o f this manual was to convince the fighters that what they did was noble and their 
cause worthwhile. The problem with the manual is that it condoned the killing and 
kidnapping of non-combatants and went on to explain how to rationalize the killings. The 
manual suggested slogans to help people appreciate contra weapons and promises to 
return the people to a true democracy. Given that the system before the revolution was a 
dictatorship and that it was well known that top contra commanders and some field 
personnel were ex-Guardia, it was hardly surprising that few Nicaraguans were inspired by
90
these empty phrases. Armed propaganda was outlined: Destroy military or police 
installations, remove survivors to a public place, set up ambushes, cut communication 
lines, humiliate “personnel symbols” of the government, reduce the influence of individuals 
in tune with the regime and take them out o f town. The manual also outlined how to 
develop and control a front organization in urban areas. Criminals should be hired to carry 
out some of the FDN’s dirty work.
The story of the manual broke in 1984, just before Reagan and Mondale were to 
debate foreign policy. Congress acted appalled. What was important in the legalistic 
minds o f the Capitol was that the manual seemed a direct contravention of a presidential 
directive explicitly barring the CIA from getting involved in assassinations. “No person 
employed by or acting on behalf o f the U.S. Government should engage in or conspire to 
engage in assassinations.”
Staff from the CIA was flabbergasted. They though that this was a war. Back in 
1983, secret CIA briefings already admitted that “Sandinista officials in the provinces, as 
well as heads o f cooperatives, nurses, doctors, and judges” had been killed by contra 
rebels. Duane Clarrige, head of the CIA’s Latin American divisio, said “these events don’t 
constitute assassinations because as far as we are concerned, assassinations are only those 
o f heads o f state.”37 One CIA agent in Honduras said, “let’s face it, our people are 
teaching people (contras) how to kill people, how to set up ambushes, how to set up a 
Claymore (landmine) so it can kill the most people.” Another CIA veteran suggested that 
it wasn’t the manual that made killers o f the FDN’s commanders. Most in the CIA 
thought the manual flap would quickly blow over. However, the manual epitomized in the
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eyes of Congress the clumsiness and dubious morality of the covert program and led to a 
freeze of U.S. contra funding in the fell o f 1984.
The CIA also produced a second manual called The Freedom Fighters Manual, 
which was written in comic book style.38 The emphasis in this short book was on 
sabotage techniques ranging from petty acts to life threatening violence. The manual 
reads like textbook monkey wrenching. Its explicit aim was to be a guide to “liberate 
Nicaragua from oppression and misery by paralyzing the military-industrial complex o f the 
traitorous Marxist state without having to use special tools and with minimal risk for the 
combatant.” “Don’t do maintenance work. Hide and damage tools ... arrive late to work 
... call in sick to work ... leave lights o n ... leave water taps on ... plant flowers on State 
farms... hoard and steal food ... drop typewriters... paint anti-Sandinista slogans ... pour 
water in gas tanks ... put dirt in the carburetor... take an ice pick to the gas tank, tires, 
and radiators ... put nails on roads and highways ... make a molotov cocktail” (the 
illustration shows a man throwing it at a police station), and so forth.
Even with all the CIA training and funding, the contra army virtually disintegrated 
under fire out in the bush. Commanders were making fools o f themselves. There were 
numerous failures. The contras employed inhuman field practices and they showed 
themselves to be incompetent also.39 The CIA was falling into an old pattern; American 
military was failing.
“If  the FDN and Pastora’s people can’t really do things that hurt, then it’s got to be 
worked out another way,” is the way, one senior intelligence official recalls the attitude 
during that period.40 “There was a push to have some kind of success in Nicaragua,
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something that would quell congressional criticism.” Large scale violent injuring is 
necessary to win both the war and congressional support. When the contras couldn’t do 
the job alone, more violent machinery was brought in to fill the gap.
In high-tech operations, for obvious reasons of discipline and skill, the CIA preferred 
to use its own people. “Unilaterally controlled Latino assets” it called the men it 
contracted from Ecuador and various other South American countries. In September and 
October of 1983, a series o f attacks on Nicaragua’s port facilities were begun.41 Before 
dawn on October 10, 1983, millions o f gallons o f fuel erupted into flames on the Corinto 
waterfront. The FDN claimed responsibility, but no Nicaraguan had anything to do with 
the attack. “Latino assets” using speedboats to work from a CIA mother ship anchored 
several miles out at sea had carried it out.42
The CIA and the U.S. were feeling more potency after they had easily taken over the 
tiny Caribbean island of Grenada. On January 2, 1984, an assistant woke contra 
spokesman Edgar Chamorro and gave him a press statement. The FDN had mined 
Nicaragua’s harbors, it said. Telegrams were to be sent to Lloyd’s of London so that 
insurance rates would rise. The FDN dutifully claimed credit. But the FDN had not done 
any part of that job either or other mining operations that followed. The CIA’s men,
43working off a mother ship again, had planted the small explosive devices in the harbors. 
The idea was to squeeze the Sandinistas economy as the contra forces themselves were 
never able to do. The effort failed. Most ships continued to come in, despite some 
damage. Exxon announced that it would no longer send its tankers into Nicaraguan ports, 
but - in a now familiar pattern - the Soviet Union soon moved to fill the gaps with its own
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ships.
The first reports of all this went largely unremarked in Washington. But when the 
French offered to clear the ports and other American allies began to protest the operation, 
Congress started to take note.44 The Senate felt it had been deceived. Nicaragua took the 
matter o f the mining and the entire secret war to the World Court, won, and the Reagan 
administration had to disavow the court’s jurisdiction.45 The pretense o f legality for the 
operation against Nicaragua was being stripped away along with its secrecy.
In the wake of the temporary loss of U.S. Congressional support for the Contras, 
numerous international networks were set up to funnel expertise, money, and guns to the 
contra cause. In clear violation o f numerous laws and the Boland amendment, deals were 
struck with South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, South Korea, Israel, China, and Iran as 
well as with numerous private organizations.46 Illegal air support systems were 
established throughout the contra war, resulting in the infamous Hasenfus capture.47 
Reagan suffered some political fallout from these activities when the Iran-Contra hearings 
were broadcast live nationwide in 1987.
In 1985, Reagan declared an embargo on Nicaragua which remained firmly in place 
until 1990 when UNO candidate Violeta Chamorro was elected president and the 
Sandinistas were voted out o f power by their own people. Throughout the 1980’s the 
U.S. was successful in discouraging and prohibiting Nicaragua from receiving badly 
needed loans and aid from the International Monetary Fund.48
Let me be clear that my attempt in this chapter was to briefly outline the general 
strategies of the contra war. This is not an exhaustive account and is only intended to
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provide a glimpse into the various facets, dimensions, and levels of terror perpetrated on 
Nicaragua by the U.S. during the contra war. There is much more to this sordid tale 
which is available in references. The contra war wound down in the late 1980’s as peace 
accords and cease-fires began to take hold. A program of amnesty and demilitarization of 
the contras, in conjunction with a radical downsizing of the Nicaraguan military was 
agreed upon. In the next several sections the empirical consequences of the contra war 
are outlined, with an emphasis on the period 1980-1985.
By May 1986, a total o f 4,429 war related deaths had been reported in Nicaragua.49 
The dead included at least 210 persons under 12 years o f age, 274 high school or college 
students, and 76 technicians or professionals.50 Nearly a third of all deaths occurred 
among civilians.51 The rate o f war related deaths among Nicaraguans exceeds that of the 
United States during the Viet Nam War or World War II.52 By the end of 1985, over 100 
rural communities had been attacked, 345 vehicles had been ambushed, and 51 
assassinations o f local leaders by contras had been reported.53
Among survivors of contra attacks, the predominant wound site is the lower 
extremities as a result of fragmentation and explosion caused by mines and mortars.54 
Contra leaders had made a strategic decision to expand such attacks with materials and 
guidance supplied through United States congressional appropriations.55 The methods of 
the contras had remained the same throughout the 1980's. During the 18 month (March 
1988 to November 1989) unilateral cease fire, contras killed 736, wounded 1,153 and 
kidnapped 1,481. The total killed in the contra war was over 30,000 as o f March 1,
1990.56
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In four major wars of the twentieth century, a minority o f all casualties became 
fatalities.57 In contrast, among Nicaraguan casualties since 1982, close to half were 
fatalities.58 This appears to result from the particular nature of the contra attacks: mining 
of rural roads, mortar attacks on isolated villages, and ambushing vehicles. Contra 
military strategies have resulted in a high number of casualties among health personnel.
By December 1985, 42 salaried health workers were reported to have been killed by 
contras, 31 others were kidnapped, and 11 more were reported to have been wounded.59 
Some of the medical victims, such as Dr. Gustavo Sequira, Vice Dean of the Managua 
Medical School, and Dr. Myrna Cunningham, Governor o f the Northern Zelaya province, 
were well-known members o f the Nicaraguan medical establishment. Most victims, 
however, were young health professionals who worked in isolated rural communities.60 
"Low Intensity Conflict" targeted the civilian population for hostilities. Doctors, nurses 
and patients were frequent victims. It goes without saying that this violated customary 
and statutory international law regarding the neutrality o f health personnel in situations of 
war.
Contra actions led to the destruction of 300 work centers and 58 schools and the 
closing of 502 more, and the destruction o f 2,100 homes and 11 social welfare centers as 
o f early 1986.61 This has reportedly affected 7% of elementary students and 6% of adult 
education students.62 Sixty-five health facilities, including four large clinics and one 
hospital, were reported to have been completely or partially destroyed.63 In addition, 37 
health units in war zones were abandoned by the government. The loss in available 
facilities coincided with an increased need for medical and social services. The war
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created a large group of disabled young adults needing rehabilitative care and equipment. 
About nine thousand orphans resulted from death to adults.64 The Nicaraguan 
government estimates that close to 10% of the country's inhabitants lost access to health 
services because of war.65
The Nicaraguan Ministry o f Health estimated that a total o f $25 million in damage to 
the health system was sustained.66 The economic value of destruction to the health system 
was only a small part o f the estimated $2 billion worth o f losses sustained by the country 
as a result o f the war through 1985.67
Contra attacks, lack o f supplies, and war related economic instability forced about
250,000 Nicaraguans from their homes. About half o f the displaced resettled in some 80 
new communities established by the government in areas near their original homes.68 
Most o f the displaced fled to major cities. This migration was a severe strain on the social 
and health infrastructure o f the country. Emergency services were established for new 
relocation settlements. Setting up these emergency services was a severe drain on the 
country's economy, since defense and reconstruction consumed most o f the national 
budget.69
During the period of January 1983 to April 1985, the number o f malaria cases 
detected in the war zones was 17 % greater than the monthly average during the previous 
eight years.70 War-related population movements, the inability to carry out timely disease 
control activities, and shortages of health personnel in the war zones are likely responsible 
for the inability to reduce malaria transmission in these areas. Underreporting of malaria 
cases in areas o f conflict underestimates the differences in malaria incidence in the war and
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non-war zones.71 Malaria moves from the war zones into the rest of the country. An 
investigation o f positive cases in three o f the eight non-war provinces during the first six 
months o f 1984 showed that 78% of all slide-verified cases were imported from war 
zones.72 The risk of contracting and reporting a case from these areas was 7.6 times 
greater than the rest of the country,
A measles epidemic in 1985-86 appeared to be intimately related to the war. 
Coverage of children under five years o f age with measles vaccine had risen to above 50% 
for the first time in Nicaragua in 1982. Successive community health campaigns and 
immunizations provided through the primary health system further raised coverage in 
ensuing years. This was associated with the reporting o f 200 to 75 cases per year in a 
declining trend during 1981-84. With the growth of the war in 1983, coverage with 
measles vaccines declined in war Regions One and Six. More importantly, many isolated 
rural communities went wholly unvaccinated because of the danger posed by the war to 
health volunteers and medical professionals. This lack of coverage continued through 
1985, creating a large pool of susceptibles under five years of age. By July o f 1985, an 
epidemic was noted in Region Six. By February 1986, the epidemic had spread to Region 
One. During the first nine months o f 1986, Regions One and Six registered 51% of the 
2,021 measles cases reported in Nicaragua. No cases o f polio have been reported since 
1981. Promotion of maternal immunization since 1983 has brought a gradual reduction in 
the number o f reported cases o f neonatal tetanus, from 132 in 1981 to 76 in 1985. The 
decline in neonatal tetanus cases would likely have been greater if the war had not 
disrupted efforts to train and supply rural midwives.73
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Estimated infant mortality levels have remained stable since 1983 at 76 per 1,000 
births. This follows rapid improvements in Nicaragua's mortality profile from 1979 to 
1983.74 A survey of 10,000 homes in 1986 found a more rapid decline in infant mortality 
in outlying regions than was expected. There is evidence, however, of a rise in infant 
mortality rates in Managua during the period of 1985-87. This rise may be the result of a 
rapid influx o f people from the war zones.
When the Sandinistas ousted the Somoza dictatorship in 1979, the United States 
shifted its most stable geopolitical "home base" northward to Honduras, which shares 
borders with Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala. This vigorous Honduran role in 
Central America is causing a series of environmental problems. A high ranking official 
from the Honduran Ecological Association recently told a member of EPOC A, the 
Environmental Project on Central America, that "although we are very grateful to U.S.- 
AID for its support for our environmental programs," this support is "overwhelmed by 
U.S. military spending."75
Honduras and the United States staged nearly continuous joint military maneuvers 
from 1980 to 1985. United States military aid increased nearly fifty-fold since 1979, 
topping $190 million in 1984.76 The United States armed forces have used the maneuvers 
to build numerous military bases, roads, port facilities, warehouse sites and airfields. Nine 
military air bases have been built in Honduras since the Reagan administration took office. 
The United States has also built, housed, armed and trained the Contra army of over
10,000 men.
Although the environmental impact of these activities is difficult to assess, some
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evidence is beginning to emerge. The main impact has been the destruction of forests. A 
document produced by Honduras' State Forestry Corporation claimed that the United 
States-Honduran joint maneuvers known as Cabanas-86 destroyed 10% of the country's 
pine forests on the savanna near the Nicaraguan border.77 The military conflict has a 
ripple effect throughout the ecology of the region. The contra war created war-related 
movement o f people and animals. A confidential report to the President o f Honduras by a 
number of government agencies asserts that the contra war threatened their second most 
important export base, namely, forests. According to newspaper accounts "Nicaraguan 
refugees and contras have generated a wave of destruction in Honduran forests." While 
Salvadoran refugees were kept in camps surrounded by soldiers, some 20,000 Nicaraguan 
refugees, according to the report, were subject to little control. The resultant 
environmental destruction included deforestation for subsistence agriculture, land clearing 
to establish contra bases, black market export o f parrots, and illegal exploitation of tree 
species including mahogany, cedar and pine.
The United States, true to form, ignored the environmental impact o f its activities in 
Honduras and Nicaragua. Joseph G. Hanley, spokesman for the United States National 
Guard, which actively participated in United States military projects in Honduras, told the 
Washington Post that engineering projects in Honduras are "less environmentally 
constrained" than in the United States. "If you're building a road," he said, "you don’t 
have to worry about the width of the culverts, about the Environmental Protection Agency
• 78or about the environmentalists. Those are not concerns down here."
The Honduran Ecological Association (HEC) disagreed with Mr. Hanley.
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According to one of its leaders, "we are very concerned about these roads. They are 
causing significant erosion and sedimentation in our aquifers." The HEC claimed that 
United States soldiers were shooting Honduran wildlife for sport. The United States 
troops also brought live parrots home with them as souvenirs of their tour of duty.79 The 
United States-backed contra army based on Honduras' southern border with Nicaragua 
increased pressure on diminishing forest animal populations by eating them. According to 
Adolfo Calero, a Contra leader, "most o f our people have to feed themselves on 
wildlife."80
In addition to causing ecological destruction in their host countries of Honduras and 
Costa Rica, the United States-backed contras targeted environmentalists and their 
programs in the war to overthrow Nicaragua's Sandinista government. The contras attack 
environmentalism as part of a coordinated strategy to disrupt government programs and 
separate the general population from the Sandinistas by making it clear that government 
programs - health, education, agriculture and environment - were contra targets.
Within Nicaragua, contras directly attacked environmentalists and their projects in 
the field. In the years 1985-87 the contras burned reforested areas, destroyed tree 
nurseries, jeeps and offices. Nicaragua's environmental agency, DIRENA, closed the 
country's only tropical rain forest national reserve, the Salaya National Park, in 1983, 
when contras kidnapped the park's administrator and two rangers.81
The program and staff o f DIRENA (formerly IRENA) was decimated by a series of 
budget cuts in 1989 which slashed all government programs - from defense to 
environment - by 40% to 70%. Previously an autonomous agency, DIRENA has been
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subsumed under the Ministry of Agriculture (MIDINRA) and is now reduced primarily to 
serving the more immediate priority of supporting the food production system. Many of 
DIRENA's ambitious wildlands and reforestation projects begun in the late 1980’s were 
shelved due to the exigencies o f Nicaragua's survival economy. The official inflation rate 
in 1988 in Nicaragua was 1300%.
Some of the more toxic pesticides that the Sandinista government banned in 1980 
(like DDT, aldrin and dieldrin) are being used again because there are no alternatives. 
Despite a historical commitment to worker safety and environmental protection 
MIDINRA is constrained now to provide resources to maximize food production, which 
means distributing leftover pesticides donated by foreign governments or pulling banned 
chemicals out o f storage.82 The soft path is quickly abandoned in favor o f a harsh 
technologically specified solution. War abruptly pushes hard technology to the surface 
when progressive alternatives are no longer sustainable.
Lake Managua is now one of the most polluted lakes in the world. This tragedy is 
due to industrial contamination with mercury and silting, which results from 
deforestation.83 Raw sewage from Managua flows into Lake Managua; it is abhorrent that 
even by 1990 there was not even primary treatment of Managua’s municipal wastewater. 
DDT was also used in pre-Revolutionary Nicaragua to control malarial misquitos. The 
people of Nicaragua now have among the highest concentrations of DDT in human fluids, 
like breast milk, o f any country in the world.84
Chemicals, poisons and pesticides created significant health problems among 
workers. By 1979, each cotton crop was sprayed an average of 28 times with chemical
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pesticides.85 Few workers were taught to practice safety measures when handling these 
pesticides. The situation is better now, Spanish precaution labels appear on containers, 
(they used to be in English) and most people can read.
The point of United States sponsored contra intervention in Nicaragua was injury 
and terror, not military victory. The attitude of U.S. planners was that the resulting 
morbidity and mortality rates were an acceptable price to pay. That Nicaraguans suffered 
to accomplish U.S. strategic and ideological goals seems to have been studiously ignored. 
In summary, the contra war was palpable inside Nicaragua. In the U.S. there were very 
few, if any, direct consequences either politically or economically. Nicaragua is such a 
small economy even under the best of situations that any economic effects o f the contra 
war inside the U.S. did not even register. As stated earlier, the policy device procured 
only limited political drama and several congressional reports on the internal side o f the 
divide. Even when the “secret war” became well known, there was limited social action 
on the internal side o f the divide. The U.S. government frowned upon individuals and 
groups, which sought to directly engage the “enemy,” thus step outside its assigned role of 
silent passive consumer. Many were moved to simply fly down to Nicaragua and check it 
out. There were numerous, and still are, work brigades, Spanish intensive workshops and 
independent fact finding missions to Nicaragua. The most moving accounts o f the contra 
war came from first hand observation and reporting. Witness for Peace had North 
American volunteers living in the war zones and in Managua throughout the 1980’s.
There were also numerous protest rallies throughout the United States and abroad in 
opposition to the contra war. The war was generally well covered by the press. The basic
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structure of the contra war was evident if one scratched even a little below the surface of 
official policy statements. However, due to its relative hiddenness and an indifferent 
public, the contra war continued unabated throughout the 1980’s.
The contra war had its paradigmatic inaccessibility and an underlying structure 
similar to the long-standing policy devices described in Chapter 3. Nicaragua, throughout 
the twentieth century, and specifically during the contra war, was assigned the role of 
external component o f the policy device. Workers and leaders who successfully revolted 
against Somoza unsuccessfully attempted socialism. Socialism proved to be unworkable 
just as the authoritarian regime was. In both cases the people never rose above the 
ontological status o f external component o f the policy device. The system that “allowed” 
people to be obedient poor workers exacted a high price when these same workers tried to 
assert their sovereignty and autonomy. Since the local side of the policy device, which 
during “peacetime” was the Somoza dictatorship, was no longer present (its base o f power 
dissolved), another wing of the device had to be created in nearby “host” countries of 
Honduras and Costa Rica. The U.S. tried to unify militarily and ideologically contra 
forces on two fronts. By basically paying thousands of people this was accomplished. On 
a short term, instrumental level, contra attacks were extremely successful in causing injury 
to bodies and cultural artifacts. Although the contras were not militarily successful against 
the Sandinista Army, the contra war (and economic mismanagement) resulted in a new 
government and a return to power o f some of the same groups that lost power in 1979.
Chapter 5 
Conclusions
The role o f the U.S. government during the contra war as planners rather than 
killers mirrors a similar division in U.S. culture. Absorbed in fantasies o f consumption, 
American culture easily conceals from itself its culpability abroad. By not seeing through 
the policy device to its dark external underside, cultural indifference reigns. People in the 
U.S. fail to see themselves as a seamless extension of the internal component o f the policy 
device. Technology and indifference, it appears, are one and the same. One does not 
cause the other, yet neither exists independently. Where the strong hand of technology is 
near, indifference reigns.
Political choices o f 1990 and 1996 within Nicaragua indicate that, in the main, 
Nicaragua has rejected the extreme authoritarianism o f Somoza and the socialism of the 
Sandinistas. These election results show the rise o f the standard version of the device 
paradigm and its indifference to strong social justice within Nicaragua. The conversion of 
Nicaragua’s citizens from external to internal members o f the device paradigm will come 
only after periods o f extreme poverty and strong political and economic integration with 
the world economy. Voting patterns, and changes within Sandinista ideology and 
strategy, indicate this direction of social change.
Looking back, when a revolutionary process reaches political power, any cost can be 
justified. The joy of victory gives meaning to the bitter passages of the past, especially in
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the first days after the overthrow of a repressive regime. Success justifies, in the popular 
imagination and in the discourses o f the new political rulers, the sacrifices that have been 
made. In failure, on the other hand, judgment tends to be implacable, and a balanced 
analysis is rare. The thoroughness of defeat rules out any appeal to original intentions and 
factors that came into play afterwards.
Did revolution fail in Central America, then, or did it succeed? The easiest answer is 
that it failed: it failed to take power in El Salvador and Guatemala, and in Nicaragua it lost 
power in less time that it took to win it. This is the common currency in the international 
press. It carries an undeniable finger-shaking value: if the revolutionary strategy failed and 
Central America is back in the hands of those who ruled it all along, surely there is no 
point in trying anything so crazy again. Besides, as shown in Chapter Four, Nicaragua 
emerged from a decade o f war with its economy destroyed and in the midst of a crisis 
whose weight has fallen disproportionately on the very social groups that heeded the 
revolutionaries’ siren call. During the 1980’s the gross domestic product per person fell 
by 41 percent in Nicaragua, 18 percent in Guatemala and 15 percent in El Salvador.1
Turning the same logic in a different direction, however, one could easily blame the 
damage on the resistance o f ruling groups to social change, their insistence on holding on 
to their social privilege, their commitment to authoritarianism. If the ruling groups had 
been less intransigent, in short, things might have been different. Faced with electoral 
failure and the continual defeat o f reforms in the 1960s and 1970s, many in Central 
America concluded that there was nothing left but to accept the appeal o f revolution, or at 
least collaborate with it, to have a chance at political success and a minimum of personal
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well-being.
Was that a mistake? Should people have gone on accepting poverty and exploitation, 
repression and bloodshed? Should they have accepted electoral fraud and abuse as 
inevitable? These questions go far beyond the Central American case alone. They are part 
of the always-open question whether to resist oppression. When legal routes are closed 
off, must one be resigned to it? Who can be sure that, if the Nicaraguan people had 
accepted the Somoza dictatorship or the triumphant return of the contras or if 
Guatemalans and Salvadorans had resigned themselves to repression, exploitation and 
fraud, they would be better off today.
The Central American social revolutionary project, like any other, sought to control 
government in order to “democratize” political power, change socioeconomic conditions, 
improve workers’ access to resources -  land, work, food, education, health -  and reclaim 
national sovereignty. Our verdict on that project, therefore, cannot be reduced to the 
question of government or the state, even though that is one of its basic elements. As 
shown in Chapter 3, revolutionary mobilization by itself, opened the way for some social 
transformations and the emergence of new actors who have contributed to changing 
certain aspects of their respective communities and societies. The struggle to transform 
those designated external (workers) into the internal component of the device paradigm 
(consumers) will be a difficult and treacherous path, but one, that needs to be taken 
nonetheless.
As for the Sandinista program some general conclusions can be drawn. The 
organizational structure and internal procedures of the revolutionary party are important
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and need to be fluid and change when external conditions change. In wartime the 
structure tends to be rigid, hierarchical and clandestine. In peace time the structure and 
“party line” must be more open to substantive discussion and criticism. Content, results 
and publicly accountable internal processes must replace vague proposals to change the 
world.
What was difficult for the Sandinistas to understand was that their programs were 
sandwiched between promises o f liberty and prosperity and the more mundane tasks o f 
securing genuine technological accomplishments. The former come from advanced 
industrial countries and are broadcast via television and advertisements, the latter are the 
trench work o f eliminating disease, hunger, illiteracy and landlessness. There was 
insufficient progress in the latter and regression in the former. All a Nicaraguan had to do 
was turn on television to see the disparity between what they desired and what Sandinista 
slogans promised. When it became obvious that a socialist approach could make almost 
no progress on either front (commodities or machineries), the Sandinistas were quickly 
and consistently voted out o f top national offices. They remain a formidable political force 
but no longer have universal appeal. The socialist idea that the population has to be 
protected from the outside world no longer holds sway.
Thus Nicaragua and much o f the third world are caught between the glamour and 
appeal of technological life and the mundane politics devoted to new roads, upgrading 
schools and clinics and teaching people to read and write. Obviously, in a country where 
in 1997 40% o f the population makes about 1 U.S. dollar per day2, any improvement in 
material conditions would be welcomed. Lasting material and cultural improvement will
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come for Nicaragua only when government and business cooperate to liberate people from 
toil and starvation while also strictly respecting human rights.
A guerrilla organization does not have to spell out its program of struggle in any 
great detail. A political party, on the other hand, must offer voters as complete a platform 
as possible. When a guerrilla organization molts into a political party, it must flesh out 
specific proposals to address and resolve people’s problems surrounding core issues like 
security, work, health, food and education. Political slogans will no longer suffice. War 
allows a large number o f economic and social questions to wait until “later.” Through the 
contra war new social programs, which could not wait, were physically attacked to ensure 
failure. The factors that set off revolutionary processes ricochet through history setting 
into motion a wide array of social actions. Could the Sandinistas have foreseen the depth 
and U.S. support for a counterrevolutionary army?
As a guerrilla movement matures into a political party expectations will rise. A 
former guerrilla organization will often win more votes than expected in its first electoral 
outing as the Sandinistas did in 1984. They promise to get things done and change the 
system. But good intentions quickly bog down in bureaucracy; parliamentary majorities 
can block (or reverse) reforms, and people begin to notice that the guerrillas have 
gradually grown into the style and appearance of old political professionals. The elections 
of 1990 and 1996 in Nicaragua showed that the populace will not sit idly by while the 
FSLN learns to act as a political party.
The installation of contra forces as a legitimate political force inside Nicaragua was 
an unsuccessful attempt by the U.S. to create a new local, controllable, element of the
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policy device. When the Somoza government and Guardia dissolved in 1979, the smooth 
functioning o f the local element o f an imperialistic policy device shattered. The contras, 
with support from farmers nationwide, indigenous groups from the Atlantic coast, the 
Catholic church, numerous internal fronts, the middle bourgeoisie, and the U.S., were to 
be ushered into power. But ultimately the middle bourgeoisie returned to power, and the 
contras disarmed and disbanded as did most o f the Sandinista Army.
Although the size and importance o f the Nicaraguan economy did not appear to 
justify outfitting a counterrevolutionary army, deep ideological and security concerns 
dominated this sordid enterprise. Politics within the internal side of the device (U.S.) 
fueled the engine of contra war policy. An indifferent public, the large mass of people that 
compose the internal group, is paralyzed by a moral callousness consistent with the 
dangers o f technology described in Chapter 2. As the Sandinistas tried to exert control 
over concerns that were external to the policy device, such as literacy, environment, health 
and agrarian reform, there was a coincident and forbidding problem o f apolitical mass 
consumption within the internal population. Social indifference created the large political 
opening necessary for the Reagan administration to finance, plan and implement the contra 
war.
As imperialism wrested North America from the Indian tribes, significant benefits 
accrued to immigrants and the government. Vast resources were obtained to provide 
food, housing, energy and land for a growing nation. The contra war was different; there 
were no direct tangible benefits for the U.S. populace. Gas and oil prices were not at 
stake. We did not need Nicaraguan coffee, sugar, beef or cotton to survive. The U.S.
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economic embargo (1985-1990) had no effect on the U.S. economy. Only the external 
side, the Nicaraguan side, felt the loss of trade and foreign exchange. The only payback to 
the U.S. taxpayers, who helped finance the contra war, is that certain expropriated 
properties were returned, and U.S. trade and investment is marginally growing.
The best I can hope for is atonement and forgiveness, some attempt to dress the 
wound and feel the shrapnel buried deep inside. Rewriting history along the lines of 
neoliberal trade policies will never adequately address the horror and injuries. At best, 
capitalism can stabilize and lower interest rates and inflation, and allow for intelligent, 
compassionate investment. However, even this “utopia” would ignore the deeper and 
more troubling problem o f how technology tends to eviscerate human thought and 
engagement with the world. During the contra war we had terror and indifference.
Today we have an even less tractable situation, peace and indifference.
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